Passions of the Soul

René Descartes

The English translation and edition of *Passions de l'ame* provided here is based on the 1650 London edition (printed for A.C. and sold by J. Martin and J. Ridley). The identity of the translator is unknown.

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An Advertisement to the Reader by a friend of the Author

This book having been sent to me by Monsieur Descartes with a licence to get it printed, and annex what preface to it I pleased, I thought that it was not necessary to put any, unless the letters I have heretofore written to him to get it from him, seeing they contain many things fit to be publicly known.

Letters

First Letter

Sir,

I should have been very glad to have seen you this last summer at Paris, because I thought you would have come thither on purpose to stay there, and that having more conveniences there than any where else to try experiments, whereof you have intimated you stand in need to finish the treatises you promised to the world, you would not fail to keep your word with me, and we should shortly see them printed. But you have utterly defeated me of that joy by your return to Holland. And I cannot here refrain from telling you that I am angry with you for not letting me (before you took your journey) see the treatise of the Passions, which, I was told, you had compiled. Besides, reflecting on some words I had read in a Preface some two years since ushering the translation of your Principles into French, wherein after you had spoken succinctly of the parts of philosophy yet to be discovered, before the chief fruit thereof can be gathered, and said that you do not so much mistrust your own strength, but you dare undertake to make them all known if you had conveniences to try experiments to maintain and justify your arguments. You add that greater expenses are necessary for that purpose than a private man, as you are, is able to disburse unless assisted by the public; but that since you could not expect this assistance, you thought to rest contented from thence forwards with studying for your own private instruction, and that posterity should excuse you if you left off labouring for them. Now I am afraid in good earnest that you will envy the world the rest of your inventions, and we never shall have anything else of you, if we let you follow your own inclination. This is the reason why I thought to torment you a little with this letter, and revenge myself of your refusal of that treatise of the Passions to me by ingenuously reproving you for laziness and other faults, which I conceive, hinder you from improving your talent, as you may, and [as] your duty binds you. Upon my word, I cannot think it anything but your laziness and little care to be serviceable to mankind, which causes you not to go forwards with your physics. For though I very well understand it is impossible for you to finish it without many experiments, which ought to be defrayed by the public because they will reap the profit of it, and a private man's estate is not sufficient to do it; yet I do not believe that is your remora. For you cannot choose but obtain from the dispensers of the public treasure all you can to that purpose, if you would but vouchsafe to make known to them how the case stands, as you easily might do, had you a will to do it. But you have ever lived in a way so repugnant thereunto that there is reason to suspect that you would not accept assistance from anyone, though it were offered to you. And yet you pretend posterity shall excuse you if you take pains for it no more, on a supposition that this assistance is necessary and you cannot get it. Which gives me occasion to think not only that you are too sparing of your pains, but it may be that you have not courage enough to hope to go through with what they who have read your writings expect of you. And yet you are vainglorious as to persuade our successors that you failed not of it by any fault of your

own, but because your virtue was not encouraged as it ought to have been, and you were denied furtherance in your designs. Wherein, I see your ambition hits the mark it aimed at because they who hereafter shall view your works will conceive, by what you published a dozen years ago, that you then had found out all that since has been seen to come from you, and what remains to be investigated in physics is less difficult than what you have already made known. So that you might since have given us all that may be expected from human reason concerning physic, and other necessaries of life, if you had had conveniences to make experiments requisite thereunto. Nay, that you have found out a good part of them too, but a just indignation against the ingratitude of man hath dissuaded you from letting them participate of your inventions, so you think that by lying still forever you shall acquire as much reputation as if you took pains for it. And, it may be more, because commonly good possessed is more valued than what is desired or lamented. But I'll debar you from getting reputation without deserving it. And though I doubt not but you knew well enough what you should have done, if you would have been helped by the public. For indeed, I will cause this letter to be printed, that you may not pretend ignorance of it, that if hereafter you fail to satisfy us, you may no more impute it to this age. For know, it is not enough to obtain anything from the public to have blurted out an occasional word of it in the preface of a book, not absolutely saying that you desire it and expect it, nor giving them proofs not only that you deserve it, but that they ought for their own sakes to grant it you, in regard they expect great profit by it. It is usually seen that they, who think they have anything in them, make such a noise of it and so importunately demand what they pretend to and promise so far beyond what they can perform, that when a man only speaks modestly of himself and requires naught from any man nor promises anything certainly, what proof forever he gives otherwise of his sufficiency, he is neither looked nor thought on.

You'll say it may be that it goes against your nature to request anything, or speak advantageously of yourself because one seems a mark of a mean spirit, the other of pride. But, say I, this humour is to be corrected for it proceeds from an error of weakness rather than becoming shamefacedness and modesty. For, for matter of requests, a man has no reason to be ashamed of any unless such as he makes merely for his own peculiar benefit to those from whom in justice he ought not to exact any. So far should he be from being of those that tend to the public utility and profit of them to whom they are made, that on the contrary, he may extract glory from them, especially when he has already bestowed things on them worth much more than he would obtain of them. And for speaking advantageously of a man's self, it is true it is a most ridiculous and blameable pride when he speaks false things of himself, and it is even a contemptible vanity too when he speaks only truths merely out of ostentation, and so that no good accrue to anyone thereby. But when these things so much concern other men to know, it is most certain they cannot be concealed but out of a vicious humility, which is a sort of baseness and weakness. Now, it highly concerns the public to be advertised of what you have gathered in sciences, that thereby judging what you are able to discover in them further, it may be incited to contribute its utmost to help you therein, as in a work whose end is the general good of mankind. And the things you have already given, the important truths you have laid down in your books, are worth incomparably much more than anything you can ask for this purpose.

You may also say that your works speak enough and there is no need of adding promises and brags, which being the merchandize of juggling Mountebanks seem not becoming a man of honour, who only searches after truth. But Mountebanks are not blame-worthy for talking high and well of themselves, but for speaking untruths and things they cannot make good. Whereas those, which (I urge) you should speak of yourself, are so true and so manifestly proved in your writings that the strictest rules of modesty give you leave to ascertain them, and those of charity oblige you thereunto because it concerns others to know it. For although your writings say enough to those who examine them thoroughly and are able to understand them, yet that is not sufficient for the design I would advise you to because everyone is not able to read them, and they who manage the public affairs can scarce have any leisure to do it. It may be [that] some who have read them tell them of it; but whatsoever a man say to them of it, the little coil they know you keep, and the too great modesty you have ever observed in speaking of yourself, make them not take any great notice thereof. And indeed because it is a usual thing among them to bestow the highest terms imaginable on the commendation of very indifferent men, they are not apt to receive the immense praises bestowed on you by those who know you for exact truths. Whereas when any man speaks of himself extraordinarily, they hearken to him with more attention, especially if he be a man of good birth and they know him to be neither by nature nor his rank likely to act the Mountebank. And, because he would become ridiculous if he should use hyperboles on such an occasion, his words are taken in their true sense. And they who will not believe them are incited at least by their curiosity, or jealousy, to examine the truth of them. Wherefore it being most certain and the public being much concerned in knowing that no man in the world but yourself (at least whose writings we have) ever discovered the true principles, and understood the first causes of whatever is produced in nature; and that having already given an account by these Principles, of all those things which are most visible and frequently observed in the world, you need only some particular observations to find out, in like manner, the reasons of whatsoever may be useful to man in this life, and so give us a complete knowledge of the nature of all minerals, the virtues of all plants, the properties of animals, and generally all that may be beneficial to physics, or other arts. And lastly, that these particular observations not being possible to be all made in a final time without great expense, all people of the earth ought emulously to contribute thereunto, as to the most important thing in the world, wherein they have all an equal interest. This being, I say, most certain to be sufficiently proved by your works already printed, you should talk so loud of it, publish it with so much care, and put it so punctually in all the title pages of your books, that none hereafter might pretend ignorance. So at least, you would immediately beget a longing in many to examine what the matter is: so that the further they enquired into it, and the more diligently they read your books, they would the more clearly understand you not [to be] unjustly boasted.

And I would with you chiefly to clear three things to the world. First, that there are a numerous company of things to be found out in physics that may be extremely profitable for life. Secondly, that there is great reason to expect the finding them out from you. And thirdly, that the more conveniences you had to make experiments, the more of them you could find out. It is necessary to be informed of the first because most men think there can nothing be found out in the sciences better than what has been found by the Ancients, and some conceive not so much as what the meaning of physics is, or what they are good for.

Now it is easy to prove that the too great reverence born to antiquity is an error extremely prejudicial to the advancement of sciences. For it is seen that the savage people of America, and many others who inhabit places less remote, have many less conveniences of life than we, and yet their original is as ancient as ours so that they have as much reason as we to say that they are satisfied with the wisdom of their fathers, and that they believe no man can teach them better than what has been known and practiced among them from all antiquity. And this opinion is so prejudicial that till it be rejected it is impossible any new learning can be acquired. Besides, experience shows that the people whose mind it is deepest rooted in are they who are yet most ignorant and least civilized. And, because it is frequent enough yet amongst us, that may be one reason to prove that we are far from knowing all we are capable of, which may be proved by many exceeding[ly] profitable inventions, as the use of the compass, the art of printing, perspective glasses, and the like, which were not found out till these latter ages, although now they seem very easy to those that know them. But there is nothing wherein our necessity of acquiring new knowledge is more apparent than in physic; for although no man doubts that God has furnished this earth with all things necessary for man to conserve him therein in perfect health until an extreme old age; and although there be nothing in the world so desired as these things so that heretofore it has been the study of kings and sages; yet experience shows we are so far from having it wholly that oftimes a man is chained to his bed by final diseases, which the most learned physicians understand not, and only make them rage more by their remedies when they undertake to expel them. Wherein the defect of their art, and the necessity of perfecting it, is so evident that for those who understand not what the meaning of physics is, it is enough to tell them that it is the science which should teach so perfectly to understand the nature of man, and all things that may serve him for nutriments or remedies, that it might be easy for him thereby to exempt himself from all kinds of diseases. For not to speak of any other uses thereof, this alone is weighty enough to oblige the most insensible to favour the designs of a man who has already proved, by the things he has already found out, that there is great reason to expect from him the unfound remainder of that science.

But there is an extraordinary necessity that the world should know you have proved that yourself. And to this end it is requisite you use a little violence to your own nature and banish that too great modesty, which has hitherto hindered you from speaking what you are bound to do, both of yourself and others. Yet I mean not therefore to commit you to the learned of this age; the most part of those, on whom this name is conferred, to wit, those who cultivate (as they commonly call it) good literature, and the lawyers have not anything to do in what I would have you talk of. Divines and physicians have as little too, unless in the notion of philosophers: for divinity depends not a jot on physics, nor yet physic as at this day it is practiced by the most learned and prudent in that art. They are contented to follow the maxims and rules that a long experience has taught them, and do not so much condemn the lives of men as to leave their judgement, whereon it often depends on the uncertain ratiocinations of school-philosophy. None then but the philosophers are unsatisfied, among whom all who have wit are on your side, and would rejoice to see you manumit truth, so that the malignity of pedants might not be able to oppress her. For none but mere pedants can be angry at what you have to say—and in regard they are the laughing-stock and contempt of most well-bred men, you need not stand much on their displeasure. Besides, your reputation has made them already as much

your enemies as they can be. And whereas your modesty now causes some of them not to fear to set upon you, I am confident, would you but extol yourself as you might, and ought, they would see themselves so far beneath you that there is not one of them but would be ashamed to undertake you. I see no reason, then, that may detain you from boldly publishing, whatsoever you may judge serviceable to your design. And nothing seems to me better for it than what you have already written in a letter to the reverend Father Dinet, which you caused to be printed seven years since, when he was Provincial of the Jesuits of France. Non ibi, say you speaking of the Essays you had published five or six years before, unam aut alteram, sed plus sexcentis questionibus [explicui] , qua sic à nullo ante me fuerant explicata; ac quamvis multi hactenus mea scripta transversis oculis inspexerint, modisque omnibus refutare conati sunt [sint], nemo tamen, quod sciam, quicquam non verum potuit in iis reperire: fiat enumeratiò questionem omnium, que in tot saculis, quibus alia philosophia viguerunt, ipsarum ope soluta sunt, et forte nec tam multa, nec tam illustres invenientur: quinimò profiteor ne unius quidem questionis solutionem, ope principiorum Peripatetice Philosophie peculiarium, datam unquam fuisse, quam non possium demonstrare esse illegitimam, et falsam: fiat periculum; proponantur, non quidem omnes (neque enim opena pretium puto multum temporis in eà re imperidere) sed pauce aliqua selectiores, stabo promissis, etc. Thus in spite of all your modesty, the force of truth has compelled you there to write that you had stated in your first Essays, which contain naught almost but the Dioptics and the Meteors, above 600 questions of philosophy, which none before you knew how to do, and that although many looked asquint upon your writings and sought all manner of ways to confute them, yet you knew not hitherto any who had picked any untruth out of them. Whereto you subjoin, that if all the questions resolved by all other kinds of philosophising which have been in vogue since the world began were reckoned up one by one, they would not, it may be, be found so numerous, nor so eminent. Furthermore, you assure us that by those principles peculiar to the philosophy attributed to Aristotle, which only is now taught in the Schools, no man ever yet knew how to find out the true solution of any one question. And you absolutely defy all those who teach it to name any one plainly resolved by them, in the solution where of you cannot demonstrate some error. Now these things having been written to a Provincial of the Jesuits, and published above seven years since, there is no doubt but some of the ablest of that great society would have endeavoured to confute them had not they been perfectly true, or if they could have been but so much as disputed with any colour of reason. For notwithstanding the little noise you make, all men know your reputation is already so great, & they are so much interested to maintain that what they teach is not bad [that] they cannot pretend to say they slighted it. But all the learned know well enough that there is nothing in the physics of the School but what is dubious. And they know withal that to be dubious in such a matter is not much better than to be false because a science ought to be certain and demonstrative. So that they cannot think strange that you assure them their physics contain not the true solution of any one question, for that signifies no more but that it contains not the demonstration of any known truth. And, if anyone examines your writings to confute them, he finds on the other side that they contain nothing but demonstrations concerning matters formerly unknown to all the world. Wherefore being wise and advised, I wonder not that they hold their peace, but I marvel why you have not vouchsafed to take advantage of their silence, because you could not have wished anything more to make it apparent how much difference there is betwixt your physics and

others. And it is very important to observe the difference of them—that the ill opinion of those who are employed in the state, and are most successful usually have of philosophy, hinder them not from understanding the worth of yours—for they commonly conjecture what shall befall by what they have already seen to happen. And because they never saw the public reap any benefit by School philosophy unless that it has made many pendants, they cannot imagine [that] better is to be expected from yours. Unless they are brought to consider that this being altogether true, and that utterly false, their fruits must be different. In earnest, it is a strong argument to prove there is no truth in School physics, but to say it is instituted to teach all inventions profitable for life, and nevertheless, though there have many been found out from time to time, yet it never was by the means of any of these Physics, but only by chance, or custom. Or if any science has contributed thereunto, it has been only the mathematics, which alone of all human sciences has been able to prove some indubitable truths. I know well enough the philosophers admit that for one branch of their physics. But in regard they were almost all of them ignorant in it, and it was no part of it, but on the other side true physics were a part of the mathematics, this can make nothing for them. But the certainty already discovered in the mathematics makes much for you, for it is a science wherein you are acknowledged to be so excellent, and you have therein so overtopped envy that even those who are jealous of your estimation for other sciences use to say you surpass all men in this, that by granting a commendation which they knew cannot be disputed, they may be less suspected of calumny when they endeavour to rob you of others. And it is seen by what you have published concerning geometry that you there so determine how far human capacity can reach, and which is the way of solving every manner of scruple, that it seems you have reached the whole harvest, whereof those who write before you have only cropped some ears. And your successors can be but gleaners who shall gather up only those you were pleased to leave them. Besides, you have shown by the sudden and easy solution of all questions, which those who have tried you have propounded to you, that the method you use for this purpose is so infallible that you never fail to find thereby whatever the wit of man can, belonging to the things you seek after: so that to make it undoubted that you are able to bring physics to the [h]ighest perfection, you are only to prove them to be a part of the mathematics. And you have already proved it plainly enough in your principles: when explaining all sensible qualities, considering only the greatness, figures, and motions, you showed that the visible world, which is all the object of physics, contains only a small part of the infinite bodies, whereof the properties or qualities may be imagined, consists only of these very things; whereas the object of the mathematics contains all. The same may also be proved by the experience of all ages: for although from time to time many of the best wits have bestowed their time in the investigation of physics, as it cannot be said that any of them ever discovered ought (that is, attained any true knowledge of the nature of corporeal things) by any principle that belonged not to the mathematics. Whereas, by those [principles] belonging to them [mathematics], abundance of very useful things have been found out, to wit, almost all that is known of astronomy, chirurgery , and all mechanical arts. Wherein, if there be anything more than what belongs to this science, it is not drawn from any other but only from certain observations, whose true causes are unknown, which cannot be considered seriously. But it must be confessed that the knowledge of true physics is to be attained no way but by the mathematics, and your excellence in this not being doubted, there is nothing but may be expected from you in that. Yet there remains

one scruple, for that it is seen that all who have acquired some reputation in the mathematics are not, for all that, capable to find out anything in physics, nay, and some of them less comprehend the things you have written thereof than many who never learnt any science at all. But it may be answered that although undoubtedly they who have wits aptest to conceive the truths of mathematics are they who easiest understand your physics, by reason all the arguments of these are deducted from the other, it happens not always that these men have the greatest reputation for the most learned in the mathematics. Because to acquire this reputation it is necessary to study the books of those who heretofore have written of the science, which the most do not, and oftentimes, those who do, endeavouring to attain by labour what they cannot by the strength of their wit tire out their imagination, yea, hurt it, and acquire thereby many prejudices, which hinder them much more from conceiving the truths you write than passing for great mathematicians; because so few men apply themselves to this science, that oftimes there is but one of them in a whole country. And though sometimes there be more, they keep a great stir with it in regard the little they understand has cost them a great deal of pains. Now, it is not uneasy to apprehend the truths another man has discovered. It is sufficient for that, that the brain be disengaged of all sorts of prejudices and be willing to afford attention to them. Nor is it difficult to find some of a contrary bias to the rest as heretofore Thales, Pythagoras, and Archimedes, and in our age Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey and some others. Lastly, a man may without much pains imagine a body of philosophy less monstrous, and grounded on conjectures more conformable to truth, than that which is extracted from the writings of Aristotle, which has been done too by some in this age. But to frame one that contains only truths proved by demonstrations as clear and certain as those of the mathematics, there is none but you alone who have showed us by your writings that you could compass it. But as when an architect has laid all the foundations and erected the chief walls of some vast building, none doubts that he is able to finish his design because it is seen that he has already done the hardest part of it. So those who attentively have read your book of Principles, considering how you have there laid all the foundations of natural philosophy, and how great are the consequences of truths which you have therein exhibited, cannot doubt that the method you use is sufficient, whereby you may make an end of finding out the utmost that can be discovered in physics. Because the things which you have already made known, to wit the nature of the loadstone, fire, air, water, earth, and all that appears in the heavens, seem not to be less difficult than those which may be desired.

Yet I must add here, that let an architect be never so expert in his art, it is impossible he should finish the edifice he has begun if materials requisite are deficient. In like manner let your method be never so exact, yet you cannot make any further progress in the explication of natural causes, unless you be able to make requisite experiments to determine their effects; which is the last of the three things, I believe, ought chiefly to be explained, because most men conceive not how necessary experiments are, nor what expense they require. Those who, not stirring out of their study nor casting their eyes on anything but their books, undertake to discourse of nature, may well tell how they would have created the world had God given them authority and power to do it. That is, they might describe chimeras that have as much analogy with the imbecility of their wit as the admirable beauty of this universe [has] with the infinite puissance of its Maker. But without a spirit truly divine, they cannot of themselves, frame an idea of things like that which God had to create them. And though your method promise all that may be hoped for

from human wit concerning the enquiry after truth in the sciences, yet it does not promise to teach prophesy, but to deduce from certain things laid down, all truths that may from thence be deducted. And the things laid down in physics can be nothing but experiments. Moreover, because experiments are of two sorts—some easy, that depend only on the reflection a man makes on things represented to the senses of themselves, others more rare and difficult, which are not attained without some study and expense—it may be observed, that you have already inserted in your writings all that seems may be gathered out of easy experiments, and also the rarest too that you could learn out of books. For besides your explaining the nature of all qualities that move the senses, and the most ordinary bodies on the earth, as fire, air, water, and some others in them, you have also therein given in an account of all that has been observed hitherto in the heavens, of all the properties of the loadstone, and many chymical [chemical] observations. So that there is no reason to expect any more from you concerning physics till you have made more experiments, whereof you might enquire the causes. And I wonder not that you undertake not to try these experiments at your own charges, for, I know, the enquiry after the smallest things cost a great deal. And not to quote chymists [chemists], nor the rest of the hunters after secrets who use to undo themselves at that trade, I heard say that the loadstone only cost Gilbert above 50,000 crowns, though he were a man of very great parts , as he has shown by being the first who discovered the chief properties of that stone. I have also seen the Advancement to Learning and the New Atlantis, of my Lord Chancellor Bacon, who of all them that have written before you, seems to me the man who had the best notions concerning the method to be held to bring the physics to their perfection. But the whole revenue of two or three of the richest kings on the earth would not be enough to set all things he requires for this purpose on work. And although I think you do not need so many sorts of experiments as he imagines, because you may supply many as well by your dexterity as the knowledge of truths you have already found. Yet considering [the following]: that the number of particular bodies unexamined is almost infinite; that there is not any one [body] but has a great many several properties and whereof several trials may be made to take up the time and labour of many men; that according to the rules of your method, it is necessary at once to examine all things who have any affinity between them, the better to mark their differences, and to make such quantities as you may be assured that so you may profitably make use at the same time of more several experiments than the labour of a great many able men could furnish you withal; and lastly, that you cannot get these able men but at a great rate, because if some would employ themselves gratis they would not be obedient enough to your orders, and would only give you occasion to lose time. Considering, I say all these things, I easily comprehend you cannot handsomely finish the design you have begun in your principles, that is, particularly to lay open the nature of all minerals, plants, animals and man, as you have already done all the elements of the earth, and all observable in the heavens, unless the public defray the expenses necessary for that purpose. And the more liberal they shall be to you, the better you shall be able to go through with your design.

Now, because all these things may be easily comprehended by everyone, and are all so true they cannot be doubted, I am confident that if you represented them in such a manner as they might come to the knowledge of those to whom God has given power to command the people of the earth, and charge also to do their utmost to advance the common good, there is none of them but would contribute to a design so manifestly profitable to the

whole world. And though our France, which is your country, be so mighty a state that you might easily obtain from her alone whatsoever is requisite to this purpose, yet because other nations are no less interested therein than she, I am confident many would be generous enough not to give her place in that duty, and that there would not any be so barbarous as not to put in a hand.

But if all that I have written be not enough to make you of another humour, pray, at least oblige me so far as to send me your Treatise of the Passions, and give me leave to add a Preface to it, wherewith it may be printed. I will see it shall be so done that there shall be nothing you can dislike in it, but it shall be so conformable to the resentment of all those who have either wit or virtue that no man after he has read it, but shall participate in the zeal I have to the advancement of sciences, and to be &.

Paris, November 6, 1648

Response to the First Letter

Sir,

Among the many injuries and taunts I find in the long letter you took the pains to write to me, I observe so many things to my advantage that should you put it to be printed, as you declare you will, I am afraid it would be imagined there were a greater combination betwixt us than there is, and I had entreated you to insert many things that modestly would not suffer me myself to be published to the world. Wherefore I will not here insist in answering every particular, I will only tell you two reasons that, me thinks, might deter you from it. The first is I have not any conceit that the design I suppose you had in writing it can succeed; the second, that I am no whit of that humour you suppose me, that neither indignation nor distaste has taken away my desire to be serviceable to the public, whereunto I think myself very much obliged, for that those things I have already published have been by many favourably received. That I did not formerly bestow what I had written of the passions on you was because I would not be engaged to let some others see it who would have made no use of it; for since I compiled it to be read only by a princess, whose wit is so far above the common pitch that she conceives without difficulty what seems hardest to our doctors, I only purposed to unfold what therein was new. And that you may not doubt what I say, I promise you to review that tract of the Passions and to add what I conceive necessary to make it more intelligible, and then, I will send it you to do what you please with it. For I am, etc.

Egmont, December 4, 1648

Second Letter

Sir,

It is a long while since you have made me expect your tract of the passions, which I begin to despair of, and fancy with myself that you promised it to me only to hinder me from publishing the letter I formerly wrote to you. For I have reason to believe that you would be vexed if a man were about to bar you of the excuse you make to finish your physics, and my design in that letter was to bar you, since the reasons I have there laid down are such that methinks they cannot be read by anyone who has the least scruple of respect to honour or virtue but they will incite him to wish as I do, that you might obtain of the public what is requisite for the experiments you say are necessary. And I hoped it might happily alight into the hands of some who had power to make that desire effectual, whether because they had access to those who dispose the public treasure, or because they dispense it themselves. So I was confident I should find you doing whether you would or no. For I know you have too great a heart that you would not fail to repay what should thus be given you, with usury, and that would make you absolutely shake off that carelessness whereof at present I cannot refrain from accusing you, although I am, etc.

July 23, 1649

Response to the Second Letter

Sir,

I am very guiltless of the slight you are pleased to believe I used to hinder the long letter you sent me last year from being published. For besides that I cannot think it can any whit produce the effect you pretend. I have not such a propensity to idleness that the fear of labour whereunto I should be tied, were I to dive into many experiments, could pervade over the desire I have to instruct myself, and write anything useful for other men, had I from the public received conveniences to do it. I cannot so well clear myself of the carelessness you charge me with. For I confess I have been longer in reviewing the little tract I send you than I was in making it, and yet I have added to it but very few things, and have not a whit altered the discourse, which is so plain and brief that it will be easily known thereby my design was not to lay open the passions like an Orator, nor yet a moral philosopher, but only as a physician. So I foresee that this tract will have no better success than my other writings. And although the title (it may be) may invite more people to read it, yet it will not give satisfaction to any but them who take the pains to examine it considerately. Such as it is, I commit it to you, etc.

Egmont, August 14, 1649

THE FIRST PART

OF PASSIONS IN GENERAL: and occasionally of the universal nature of man.

The First Article

That what is passion in regard of the subject, is always action in some other respect.

There is nothing more clearly evinces the learning which we receive from the Ancients to be defective, than what they have written concerning the passions. For although it be a matter the understanding whereof has even been hunted after; and that it seems to be none of the hardest, because every one feeling them in himself, need not borrow foreign observations to discover their nature. Yet what the Ancients have taught concerning them, is so little, and for the most part so little credible that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but by keeping aloof off from those roads which they followed. Wherefore I shall here be forced to write in such a sort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled. And first of all I consider that all which is done, or happens anew, is by the philosophers called generally a passion in relation to the subject on whom it befalls, and an action in respect of that which causes it. So that although the agent and patient be things often differing, action and passion are one and the same thing, which has two several names, because of the two several subjects whereunto they may relate.

The Second Article

That to understand the passions of the soul, it is necessary to distinguish the functions thereof from those of the body.

Furthermore, I consider that we observe not anything which more immediately agitates our soul, than the body joined to it, and consequently we ought to conceive that what in that is a passion, is commonly in this an action; so that there is no better way to attain to the understanding of our passions, than by examining the difference between the soul and the body, that we may know to which of them each function in us ought to be attributed.

The Third Article

What rule ought to be observed for the purpose.

Which will not be found a very hard task, if it be taken notice of, that what we experimentally find to be in us, and which we see are in bodies totally inanimate, ought not to be attributed to ought else but the body, and contrarily, that all which is within us, and which we conceive cannot in any way appertain to a body must be imputed to our soul.

The Fourth Article

That heat, and the motion of the members proceed from the body, and thoughts from

the soul.

Wherefore since we do not comprehend that the body in any manner thinks, ‘tis but equitable in us to believe that all sorts of thoughts within us belong to the soul. And since we make no question but there are inanimate bodies which move as many or more several ways than ours, and which have as much or more heat (which experience shows us in flame, which alone has more heat and motion than any of our limbs) we may be assured that heat and all the motions within us, seeing they depend not on the mind, belong only to the body.

The Fifth Article

That it is an error to believe the soul gives motion and heat to the body.

Whereby we shall eschew a very considerable error which many have fallen into so far, that I believe it the cause of hindering the passions, and other things which belong to the soul from being explained hitherto. It is this, that seeing all dead bodies are deprived of heat, and consequently of motion, people imagine the absence of the soul wrought this cessation of motion and heat, and so erroneously conceive that our natural heat, and all the motions of our body depend on the soul: whereas indeed the contrary should be supposed that the soul absents itself in death, only because this natural heat ceases, and the organs which seem to move the body are corrupted.

The Sixth Article

What is the difference betwixt a living and a dead body.

That we may then avoid this error, let us consider that death never comes by any defect of the soul, but only because some one of the principal parts of the body is corrupted; and conceive that the body of a living man differs as much from that of a dead one, as a watch or any other AUTOMA (that is any kind of machine that moves of itself) wound up, having in itself the corporeal principle of those motions for which it was instituted, with all things requisite for its action, and the same watch or other engine when it is broken and the principle of its motion ceases to act.

The Seventh Article

A brief explication of the parts of the body, and of some of its functions.

To make this more intelligible, I will in few words display the pieces and lineaments, whereof this machine our body is composed. There is none that does not already know there is within us, a heart, a brain, a stomach, muscles, sinews, arteries, veins, and the like.

It is as commonly known, that meats eaten descend into the stomach, and bowels, from whence the juice of them trickling into the liver, and all the veins, mixes itself with the blood in them, and by this means augments the quantity thereof. Those who have heard talk never so little of physics, know besides this, how the heart is composed, and how all the blood of the veins may with facility drop into the hollow vein, on the right side of it, and from thence pass into the liver, by a vessel called the venous artery, then return from the liver into the left side of the heart, through the pipe, called the arterial vein, and at length pass from thence into the great artery, the branches whereof spread themselves all over the body. Yea even all those whom the authority of the Ancients has not totally blinded, and who have vouchsafed to open their eyes to examine the opinion of Harvey, concerning the circulation of the blood, make no doubt but all the veins and arteries of the body are like channels, through which the blood continually and easily glides, taking its course from the right cavity of the heart, through the arterial vein, whereof the branches are dispersed into every part of the liver, and joined to those of the venous artery by which it passes from the liver into the left side of the heart, from thence going into the great artery, the branches whereof being scattered over all the rest of the body are joined to the branches of the hollow vein which carry the same blood again into the right cavity of the heart: so that the two cavities are as it were the sluices of it, through each of which all the blood passes, every round it walks about the body. Moreover it is notorious that all the motions of the members depend upon the muscles, and that these muscles are opposite to one another in such a manner, that when one of them shrinks up, it draws after it that part of the body whereto it is knit, which causes the muscle opposite to it to stretch forth at the same time. Then again if at another time this last shrink up, the first gives way, suffering the other to attract that part it is joined unto. Finally, it is known that all these motions of the muscles, as also all the senses depend on the sinews, which are as little strings, or like small tunnels coming all from the brain, and containing as that does a certain air, or exceeding[ly] subtle wind, which is termed the animal spirits.

The Eighth Article

What is the principle of all these functions.

But it is not commonly known in what manner these animal spirits and nerves contribute to these motions and senses, nor what is the corporeal principle that makes them act. Wherefore, although I have already glanced upon it in former writings, I will not here omit to say succinctly, that while we live there is a continual heat in our heart, which is a kind of fire that the blood of the veins feeds, and this fire is the corporeal principle of all the motions of our members.

The Ninth Article

How the motion of the heart is wrought.

The first effect of it is that it dilates the blood wherewith the cavities of the heart are filled,

which is the reason that this blood having need of a larger room, passes impetuously from the right cavity into the arterial vein, and from the left into the great artery. Then, this dilatation ceasing, immediately new blood from the hollow vein enters into the right cavity of the heart, and from the venous artery into the left, for there are little skins at the entrance of these four vessels so contrived, that they will not let the blood get into the heart, but by the two last, nor come out, but by the other two. The new blood being gotten into the heart is there immediately rarefied as the former was. Hence, only is that pulse or palpitation of the heart and arteries, for this beating is reiterated as often as any new blood gets into the heart. It is also this alone which gives motion to the blood, and causes it incessantly to run very swiftly in all the arteries and veins, by means whereof it conveys the heat acquired in the heart, to all the other parts of the body, and is their nutriment.

The Tenth Article

How the animal spirits are begotten in the brain.

But what here is most considerable is, that all the most lively, and subtle parts of the blood, that heat has rarefied in the heart, continually enter in abundance into the cavities of the brain, and the reason why they go thither rather than anywhere else, is, because all the blood that issues out of the heart by the great artery bends its course in a direct line thitherward, and it not being possible for all to get in, because there are none but very narrow passages, those parts thereof that are the most agitated, and subtlest, only get in, while the rest is dispersed into all the other parts of the body. Now these very subtle parts of the blood make the animal spirits; and they need not, to this end, undergo any other change in the brain, but only be separated from the other less subtle parts of the blood. For what I here call spirits, are but bodies, and have no other property, unless that they are bodies exceeding[ly] small, which move very nimbly, as the parts of a flame issuing from a torch so that they stay not in any one place, but still as some get into the cavities of the brain, some others get out through the pores in the substance of it; which pores convey them into the nerves, and from thence into the muscles, by means whereof they mold the body into all the several postures it can move.

The 11th Article

How the muscles are moved.

For the only cause of the motion of all the members is that some muscles shrink up, and their opposites extend, as has been already said. And the only cause why one muscle shrinks rather than his opposite, is, that there come (though never so little) more spirits to the one than the other. Not that the spirits which flow immediately from the brain are alone sufficient to move these muscles, but they dispose the other spirits, which already are in these two muscles, to sally forth immediately from one of them into the other, by means whereof that from whence they came becomes longer, and flaggier*; that wherein they are, being suddenly swelled up by them, shortens and attracts the member appendant

to it, which is easily conceived when it is known that there are but very few animal spirits which proceed continually from the brain to every muscle, but that there are abundance of others locked in the same muscle, which move very swiftly in it, sometimes in whirling round only in the places where they are (this is, when they find no passages open to get out at) and sometimes by slipping into the opposite muscle. For there are little overtures in each of these muscles through which these spirits can slide from one to another, which are so disposed too, that when the spirits which come from the brain towards one of them, are but never so little stronger than those going to the other, they open all the entries through which the spirits of the other muscle can fly into this, and in the same instant bar up all those, through which the spirits of this might get into that, whereby all the spirits formerly contained in both muscles crowd suddenly into one, so swelling it up, and shortening it, while the other extends itself, and gives.

*“Flaggier,” a word of 16th Century origin which is derived from the verb “to flag,” meaning “to hang down, to become flaccid, limp, or languid.” [OED]

The 12th Article

How outward objects act contrary to the organs of the senses.

It remains yet to know the causes why the spirits slide not from the brain into the muscles always after one manner, and wherefore they come sometimes more towards some than others. For besides the action of the soul, which in truth, is in us one of the causes, as I shall show hereafter, there are yet two besides, which depend not of anything but the body, which it is necessary to take notice of. The first consists in the diversity of motions, excited in the organs of the senses by their objects, which I have already amply enough explained in the Dioptrics. But that those who see this, may not need to have read ought else, I will here repeat, that there are three things to be considered in the sinews, to wit: their marrow or interior substance, which stretches itself out in the form of little threads from the brain, the original thereof, to the extremities of the other members whereunto these threads are fastened; next, the skins wherein they are lapped, which being continuous with those that envelop the brain, make up little pipes wherein these threads are enclosed; lastly, the animal spirits, which being conveyed through these very pipes from the brain to the muscles, are the cause that these threads remain there entirely unmolested, and extended in such a manner, that the least thing that moves that part of the body, whereunto the extremity of any one of them is fastened, does by the same reason move that part of the brain from whence it comes. Just as when a man pulls at one end of a string, he causes the other end to stir.

The 13th Article

That this action of objects without, may differently convey the spirits into the muscles.

And I have made it evident in the Dioptrics, how all the objects of the sight are not communicated to us any way but thus; they move locally, (by mediation of transparent bodies between them and us) those little threads of the optic nerves, which are at the bottom of our eyes, and after them, the places of the brain from whence those nerves come. They move them, I say, as many several kinds of ways, as there are diversities of objects in things, nor are they immediately the motions made in the eye, but in the brain, that represent these objects to the soul in imitation whereof it is easy to conceive that sounds, odors, heat, pain, hunger, thirst, and generally all objects, as well of our other exterior senses, as our interior appetites, do also excite some motion in our nerves, which passes by means of them unto the brain. And besides, that these several motions of the brain create in our soul different resentments, it may so be that * without her, the spirits direct their course rather towards some muscles than others, and so they may move our members, which I will prove here, only by one example. If anyone lift up his hand on a sudden towards our eyes, as if he were about to strike, although we know he is our friend, that he does this only in jest, and that he will be careful enough not to do us any hurt, yet we can scarce restrain from shutting them. Which shows it is not by the intermeddling of our soul that they shut, since it is against our will, which is the only, or at least the principal action thereof, but by reason this machine of our body is so composed, that the moving of this hand up towards our eyes, excites another motion in our brain, which conveys the animal spirits into those muscles that close the eyelids.

* The original reads “that that” for “that.”

The 14th Article

That the diversity of the spirits may diversify their course.

The other cause which serves to convey the animal spirits variously into the muscles, is the unequal agitation of these spirits, and the diversity of their parts. For when any of their parts are more gross and agitated than the rest, they pass forwards in a direct line into the cavities and pores of the brain, and by this means are conveyed into other muscles, whereinto they should not, had they been weaker.

The 15th Article

What are the causes of their diversity.

And this inequality may proceed from the divers matters whereof they are composed, as is seen in those who have drunk much wine. The vapors of this wine entering suddenly into the blood mount up from the heart to the brain where they convert into spirits, which being stronger and more abundant than ordinary, are apt to move the body after many strange fashions. This inequality of the spirits may also proceed from the divers dispositions of the heart, liver, stomach, spleen, and all other parts contributing to their production. For it is

principally necessary here to observe certain little nerves inserted in the basis of the heart, which serve to lengthen and contract the entries of its concavities, by means whereof, the blood there dilating more, or less strongly, produces spirits diversely disposed. It is also to be noted, that although the blood which enters into the heart, comes thither from all the other parts of the body, yet it falls out often times that more is driven thither from some parts than others, by reason the nerves or muscles which answer to those parts oppress or agitate it more. And, for that according to the diversity of the parts from whence it comes most, it dilates itself diversely in the heart, and at last produces spirits of different natures, as for example, that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is, dilates itself otherwise in the heart, than that which comes from the spleen. And this after another manner than that which comes from the veins of the legs, or arms, and lastly, this quite otherwise than the juice of meats, when being newly come out of the stomach, and bowels, it passes through the liver to the heart.

The 16th Article

How all the members may be moved by the objects of the senses, and by the spirits, without the help of the soul.

Lastly, it is to be observed, that the machine of our body is so composed, that all the changes befalling the motion of the spirits may so work as to open some pores of the brain more than others. And reciprocally, that when any one of these pores are never so little more or less open than usual by the action of those nerves subservient to the senses, it changes somewhat in the motion of the spirits, and causes them to be conveyed into the muscles which serve to move the body in that manner it ordinarily is, upon occasion of such an action. So that all the motions we make, our will not contributing to them (as it often happens that we sigh, walk, eat, and to be short, do all actions common to us, and beasts) depend only on the conformity of our members, and the stream which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, follow naturally into the brain nerves, and muscles. Just as the motion of a watch is produced merely by the strength of the spring and the fashion of the wheels.

The 17th Article

What the functions of the soul are.

Having thus considered all the functions belonging to the body only, it is easy to know there remains nothing in us which we ought to attribute to our soul, unless our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some actions of the soul, others, her passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills because we experimentally find they come directly from our soul and seem to depend on nought but it. As on the contrary, one may generally call her passions all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us because oftimes our soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she always receives things as they are represented to her by them.

The 18th Article

Of the will.

Again our wills are of two sorts. For some are actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, as when we will love God, or generally apply our thought to any object which is not material. The other are actions which terminate in our body, as in this case, that we have only a will to walk, it follows that our legs must stir and we go.

The 19th Article

Of the apprehension.

Our apprehensions also are of two sorts: the soul is the cause of some, the body of the other. Those whereof the soul is the cause are the apprehensions of our wills and all the imaginations or other* thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will anything but we must at the same time perceive that we do will it. And although in respect of our soul it be an action to will anything, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble. Therefore it is not customary to call it a passion, but only an action. thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will any thing, but we must at the same time perceive that we do will it. And although in respect of our soul it be an action to will any thing, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension, and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble: therefore it is not customary to call it a passion, but only an action.

* The original reads “others” for “other.”

The 20th Article

Of imaginations, and other thoughts framed by the soul.

When our soul applies herself to fancy anything which is not, as to represent to itself an enchanted palace, or a chimera, and also when she bends herself to consider anything that is only intelligible, and not imaginable, for example, to ruminate on one’s own nature, the apprehension she has of things depends principally on the will which causes her to perceive them. Wherefore it is usual to consider them as actions rather than passions.

The 21st Article

Of imaginations caused only by the body.

Among the apprehensions caused by the body, the greatest part depend on the nerves. But yet there are some that depend not at all on them, which are called imaginations too, as well as those I lately spoke of, from which nevertheless they differ herein, that our will has no hand in framing them, which is the reason wherefore they cannot be numbered among the actions of the soul. And they proceed from nothing but this: that the spirits being agitated several ways, and meeting the traces of divers impressions preceding them in the brain, they take their course at haphazard through some certain pores, rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreams, and those dotages we often are troubled with waking, when our thought carelessly roams without applying itself to anything of its own. Now, though some of these imaginations be passions of the soul, taking this word in the genuine and peculiar signification, and though they may be all called so if it be taken in a more general acceptation,* yet seeing they have not so notorious and determined a cause as those apprehensions which the soul receives by mediation of the nerves, and that they seem to be only the shadow and representation of the others, before we can well distinguish them, it is necessary to examine the difference between them.

* The original reads “acception” for “acceptation.”

The 22nd Article

Of the difference betwixt them and the other apprehensions.

All the apprehensions which I have not yet explained come to the soul by mediation of the nerves, and there is this difference between them: that we attribute some of them to the objects from without that beat upon our senses; some to our body, or some parts of it; and lastly, the rest to our soul.

The 23rd Article

Of apprehensions which we attribute to objects from without us.

Those which we attribute to things without us, to wit, to the objects of our senses, are caused (at least, if our opinion be not false) by those objects which, exciting some motions in the organs of the exterior senses by intercourse with the nerves, stir up some in the brain which make the soul perceive them. So when we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, this sound and this light are two several actions who merely in this regard, that they excite two several motions in some of our nerves and by means of them, in the brain, delivers the soul two different resentments, which we so attribute to those subjects, which we suppose to be their causes, that we think we see the very flame, and hear the bell, not only feel certain motions proceeding from them.

The 24th Article

Of apprehensions which we attribute to our body.

The apprehensions which we attribute to our body, or any of the parts thereof, are those we have concerning hunger, thirst and other our natural appetites. Whereunto may be added pain, heat, and the rest of the affections we feel as in our members, and not in the objects without us. So, we may at the same time, by the intercourse of the same nerves, feel the coldness of our hand, and the heat of the flame it draws near to. Or contrarily, the heat of the hand, and the cold of the air whereto it is exposed. And yet there is no difference between the actions that make us feel the heat, or the cold in our hand, and those which make us feel that which is without us; unless that one of these actions succeeding the other, we conceive the first to be already in us, and that which follows, not to be yet in us but in the object that causes it.

The 25th Article

Of the apprehensions which we attribute to our soul.

The apprehensions attributed only to the soul are those whereof the effects are felt as in the soul itself, and whereof any near cause, whereunto it may be attributed is commonly unknown. Such are the resentments of joy, wrath and the like, which are sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves, and sometimes too by other causes. Now, although all our apprehensions, as well those attributed to objects without us, as those relating to divers affections of our body, be, in truth, passions in respect of our soul, when this word is taken in the more general signification, yet it is usual to restrain it to signify only those attributed to the soul itself. And they are only these latter which I here undertake to explain under the notion of passions of the soul.

The 26th Article

That the imaginations, which depend only on the accidental motion of the spirits, may be as real passions, as the apprehensions depending on the nerves.

It is here to be observed that all the same things which the soul perceives by intercourse with the nerves, may also be represented to it by the accidental course of the spirits. And [there is] no difference between them but this, that the impressions which come from the brain by the nerves, are usually more lively, and manifest than those the spirits excite there, which made me say in the one and twentieth Article, that these are only as the shadow, and representation of these. It is also to be noted, that it sometimes falls out, this picture is so like the thing it represents, that it is possible to be deceived concerning the apprehensions attributed to whose objects without us, or those referred to any parts of our body, but not to be served so concerning the passions, for as much as they are so near, and interior to our soul that it is impossible she should feel them, unless they were truly such

as she does feel them. So oftentimes when one sleeps, and sometimes too being awake, a man fancies things so strongly that he thinks he sees them before him, or feels them in his body, though there be no such thing. But although a man be asleep, and doate*, he cannot feel himself sad or moved with another passion, but it is most true that the soul has in it that passion.

* “Doate,” a variation of “dote” which means to be silly, deranged, or out of one’s wits.

The 27th Article

The definition of the passions of the soul.

After we have thus considered wherein the passions of the soul differ from all other thoughts, me thinks they may be generally defined thus: apprehension, resentments, or emotions of the soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits.

The 28th Article

An explication of the first part of the definition.

They may be called apprehensions when this word is used in a general sense to signify all thoughts that are not actions of the soul, or the wills, but not then when it only signifies evident knowledge. For experience shows us that those who are most agitated by their passions are not such as understand them best, and that they are in the catalogue of those apprehensions which the alliance between the soul and the body renders confused and obscure. They may also be called resentments because they are received into the soul in the same manner as the objects of the exterior senses, and are not otherwise understood by her. But they may justlier* be styled the emotions of the soul, not only because this name may be attributed to all the mutations befalling her, (that is all the various thoughts thereof) but particularly, because, of all kinds of thoughts that she can have, there are many that agitate and shake it so hard as these passions do.

* i.e., “more justly”.

The 29th Article

An explication of the other part.

I add that they are attributed particularly to the soul to distinguish them from other resentments relating, some to exterior objects, as smells, sounds, colours; the others, to our body, as hunger, thirst, pain. I also subjoin that they are caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits to distinguish them from our wills, which cannot be called emotions of the soul attributed to her but caused by herself; as also to unfold their last, and

immediate cause that distinguishes them (again) from other resentments.

The 30th Article

That the soul is united to all the parts of the body jointly.

But to understand all these things more perfectly, it is necessary to know that the soul is really joined to all the body, but it cannot properly be said to be in any of the parts thereof, excluding the rest, because it is one, and in some sort indivisible by reason of the disposition of the organs, which do all so relate one to another that when any one of them is taken away, it renders the whole body defective. And, because it is of a nature that has no reference to extension, dimensions, or other properties of matter, whereof the body is composed, but only to the whole mass or contexture of organs as appears by this: that you cannot conceive the half or third part of a soul, nor what space it takes up, and that it becomes not any whit less by cutting off any part of the body, but absolutely withdraws when the contexture of its organs is dissolved.

The 31st Article

That there is a little kernel* in the brain wherein the soul exercises her functions more peculiarly than in the other parts.

It is also necessary to know that although the soul be joined to all the body, yet there is some part in that body wherein she exercises her functions more peculiarly than all the rest. And, it is commonly believed that this part is the brain, or it may be the heart. The brain, because thither tend the organs of the senses, and the heart because therein the passions are felt. But having searched this business carefully, me thinks I have plainly found out that that part of the body wherein the soul immediately exercises her function is not a jot of the heart, nor yet all the brain, but only the most interior part of it, which is a certain very small kernel situated in the middle of the substance of it and so hung on the top of the conduit by which the spirits of its anterior cavities have communication with those of the posterior, whose least motions in it cause the course of the spirits very much to change, and reciprocally, the least alteration befalling the course of the spirits cause the motions of the kernel very much to alter.

* the pineal gland.

The 32nd Article

How this kernel is known to be the principal seat of the soul.

The reason which persuades me that the soul can have no other place in the whole body but this kernel where she immediately exercises her* functions is for that I see: all the other parts of our brain are paired, as also we have two eyes two hands, two ears; lastly, all

the organs of our exterior senses are double and forasmuch as we have but one very thing at one and the same time. It must necessarily be that there is some place where the two images that come from the two eyes, or the two other impressions that come from any single object through the double organs of the other senses, have somewhere to meet in one, before they come to the soul, that they may not represent two objects instead of one. And it may be easily conceived that these images, or other impressions, join to hither in this kernel by intercourse of the spirits that fill the cavities of the brain, but there is no other place in the body where they can be so united, unless it be granted that they are in this kernel.

* Original reads “for”.

The 33rd Article

That the seat of the passions is not in the heart.

For the opinion of those who think the soul receives her passions in the heart, it is not worth consideration, for it is grounded upon this: that the passions make us feel some alteration there. And it is easy to take notice that this alteration is only felt in the heart by the intercourse of a small nerve, descending to it from the grain, just as pain is felt in the feet, by intercourse of the nerves of the foot, and the stars are perceived as to be in the firmament, by the intercourse of their light and the optic nerves. So that it is no more necessary that our soul exercise her functions immediately in the heart to make her passions be felt there than it is necessary she should be in the sky to see the stars there.

The 34th Article

How the soul and the body act one against another.

Let us then conceive that the soul holds her principal seat in that little kernel in the midst of the brain, from whence she diffuses her beams into all the rest of the body by intercourse of the spirit, nerves, yea and the very blood, which participating the impressions of the spirits, may convey them through the arteries into all the members. And remembering what was formerly said concerning this machine our body, to wit, that the little strings of our nerves are so distributed into all parts of it, that upon occasion of several motions excited therein by sensible objects, they variously open the pores of the brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in the cavities thereof, to enter divers ways into the muscles, by whose means they can move the members all the several ways they are apt to move and also that all the other causes which can differently move the spirits, are enough to convey them into several muscles. Let us here add, that the little kernel which is the chief seat of the soul hangs so between the cavities which contain these spirits, that it may be moved by them as many several fashions as there are sensible diversities in objects. But withal, that it may be moved several ways by the soul too, which is of such a nature, that she receives as many various impressions (that is, has as many several apprehensions) as there come several motions into this kernel. As also on the other

side, the machine of the body is so composed that this kernel being only divers ways moved by the soul, or by any other cause whatsoever, it drives the spirits that environ it towards the pores of the brains, which convey them by the nerves into the muscles by which means it causes them to move the members.

The 35th Article

An example of the manner how the impressions of objects unite in the kernel in the middle of the brain.

As, for example, if we see any creature come toward us, the light reflected from his body paints two images, one in each eye, and these two images beget two others by intercourse with the optic nerves in the interior superficies of the brain that looks towards its concavities. From thence, by intercourse of the spirits wherewith these cavities are filled, these images glance in such a manner on the little kernel, that these spirits encompass it and the motion which composes any point of one of these images tends to the same point of the kernel to which that motion tends that frames the point of the other image which represents, too, part of this creature; by which means the two images in the brain make up but one single one upon the kernel, which acting immediately against the soul, shows her the figure of that creature.

The 36th Article

An example how the passions are excited in the soul.

Furthermore, if this figure be very strange and hideous, that is, if it have much similitude with such things as have formerly been offensive to the body, it excites in the soul the passion of fear, afterwards, that of boldness, or else an affright or scaring according to the various temper of the body, or the force of the soul, and according as a man has formerly protected himself by defence or flight against noxious things whereunto the present impression has some resemblance. For this renders the grain so disposed in some men that the spirits reflected from the image so formed on the kernel go from thence to fall, part into the nerves, which serve to turn the back and stir the legs to run away, and part into those which (as is spoken of before) let out or draw up together the orifices of the heart, or which else so agitate the rest of the parts from whence the blood is sent, that this blood not being rarefied there in the usual manner, sends spirits to the brain that are fitting to maintain, and confirm the passion of fear, that is, such as are proper to hold open, or open again the pores of the brain that convey them into the very same nerves. For the mere entry of these spirits into these pores excites in this kernel a particular motion instituted by nature to make the soul feel that passion. And because these pores relate principally to the little nerves that serve to lock up or open wide the orifices of the heart, this makes the soul feel it as if it were chiefly in the heart.

The 37th Article

How it appears they are all caused by some motion of the spirits.

And because the like happens in all the other passions, to wit, that they are principally caused by the spirits contained in the cavities of the brain—seeing they direct their course towards the nerves which serve to enlarge or straighten the orifices of the heart either to thrust the blood in the other parts differently to it, or whatsoever other way it be, to feed the self same passion—it may be clearly understood by this: wherefore, I formerly inserted in my definition that they are caused by some peculiar motion of the spirits.

The 38th Article

An example of the motions of the body that accompany the passions and depend not of the soul.

Moreover, as the course which these spirits take towards the nerves of the heart is sufficient to give a motion to the kernel, whereby fear is put into the soul, even so, by the mere going of the spirits at that time into those nerves which serve to stir the legs to run away, they cause another motion in the same kernel, by means whereof the soul feels and perceives this flight, which may in this manner be excited in the body, by the mere disposition of the organs, the soul not at all contributing to it.

The 39th Article

How the same cause may excite divers passions in divers men.

The same impression that the presence of one formidable object works upon the kernel and which causes fear in some men may in others rouse up courage and boldness. The reason whereof is that all brains are not alike disposed, for the same motion of the kernel, which in some excites fear, in others causes the spirits to enter into the pores of the brain, which convey them, part into the nerves which serve to use the hands for defense, and partly into those which agitate, and drive the blood towards the heart, in that manner as is required to produce spirits proper to continue this defense, and retain a will to it.

The 40th Article

What the principal effect of the passions is.

For it must be observed that the principal effect of all the passions in men is, they incite and dispose their souls to will the things for which they prepare their bodies so that the resentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldness, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest.

The 41st Article

What is the power of the soul in respect of the body.

But the will is so free by nature that it can never be constrained. And of two sorts of thoughts which I have distinguished in the soul, whereof some are her actions, to wit her wills; others, her passions, taking that word in its general signification, which comprehends all forms of apprehensions. The first are absolutely in her own power, and cannot, but indirectly, be changed by the body; as on the contrary, the last depend absolutely upon the actions which produce them, and they cannot, unless indirectly, be changed by the soul, except then when her self is the cause of them. And all the action of the soul consists in this, that she merely by willing anything can make the little kernel, whereunto she is strictly joined, move in the manner requisite to produce the effect relating to this will.

The 42nd Article

How the things one would remember are found in the memory.

So when the soul would remember anything, this will is the cause that the kernel nodding successively every way, drives the spirits towards several places of the brain, until they encounter that where the traces (which were left there) of the object one would remember, are. For these traces are nothing else but the pores of the brain through which the spirits formerly took their course, [and] by reason of the presence of that object have thereby acquired a greater facility to be open in the same manner again than the rest can have, by the spirits that come to them so that these spirits, meeting these pores, enter into them easier than the others, whereby, they excite a peculiar motion in the kernel, which represents the same object to the soul, and makes it know, that is it she would remember.

The 43rd Article

How the soul can imagine, be attentive, and move the body.

So when one would imagine anything one has never seen, this will has the power to make the kernel move in the manner requisite to drive the spirits towards the pores of the brain by the opening of which this thing may be represented. So, when one would fix his attention some pretty while to consider, or ruminate on one object, this will holds the kernel still at that time, leaning ever to one side. So, finally, when one would walk, or move his body any way, this will causes the kernel to drive the spirits towards the muscles which serve to that purpose.

The 44th Article

That every will is naturally joined to some motion of the kernel but that by industry, or habit, it may be annexed to another.

Notwithstanding it is not always the will to excite in us any motion or other effect that can cause us to excite it, but that changes according as nature or habit have differently joined each motion of the kernel to each thought. As for example if one would dispose his eyes to look on an object far distant, this will causes the ball of them to dilate themselves. And if one would prompt them to behold an object very near, this will contracts them; but if one thinks only to dilate the ball, he had as good do nothing, that dilates it not at all because nature has not joined the motion of the kernel, which serves to drive the spirits to the optic nerve in that manner as is requisite to dilate or contract the ball of the eye, with the will of dilating or contracting it, but with the will of looking on objects remote or at hand. And then when we speak, we only think the sense of what we would say, yet that makes us move our tongues and lips much better, and far readier than if we thought to move them in all the manners requisite to pronounce the same words. For as much as the habit we have acquired in learning to speak has taught us to join the action of the soul, which by the intercourse of the kernel can move the tongue and the lips, with the signification of the words which follow out of these motions, rather than with the motions themselves.

The 45th Article

What the power of the soul is, in respect of her passions.

Our passions also cannot be directly excited or taken away by the action of our will, but they may indirectly, by the representation of things which use[d] to be joined with the passions which we will have, and which are contrary to these we will reject. Thus to excite in oneself boldness, and remove fear, it is not enough to have a will to do so, but reasons, objects and examples are to be considered of, that persuade the danger is not great, that there is ever more security in defence than flight, that there is glory and joy in vanquishing, whereas there is nothing to be expected but grief and dishonour in flying and the like.

The 46th Article

What is the reason that hinders the soul from disposing her passions totally.

Now, there is a peculiar reason why the soul cannot suddenly alter or stop her passions, which gave me occasion to put formerly in their definition, that they are not only caused, but fomented, and fortified by some peculiar motion of the spirits. The reason is they are almost all coupled with some emotion made in the heart, and consequently in all the blood, and spirits too, so that till this emotion cease, they remain present in our thoughts just as sensible objects are present in them, while they act against the organs of our senses.

And as the soul being very attentive on any other thing, may choose whether she will hear a little noise, or feel a little pain or no, but cannot keep herself from hearing thunder, or feeling fire that burns the hand so she may easily overcome the smaller passions, but not the most violent and strongest, until after the emotion of the blood and spirits is allayed. The most the will can do, while this emotion is in its full strength, is not to consent to its effects and to restrain divers motions whereunto it disposes the body. For example, if wrath makes me lift up my hand to strike, the will can usually restrain it. If fear incites my legs to fly, the will can stop them, and so of the rest.

The 47th Article

Wherein consist those contestations which use[d] to be imagined between the superior and inferior part of the soul.

And it is only in the repugnance of those motions, which the body by its spirits, and the soul by her will, endeavour to excite at the same time in the kernel, that all the contestations which use[d] to be imagined between the inferior part of the soul called sensitive and the superior which is reasonable, or else between the natural appetites and the will, consist. For there is in us but one soul only and this soul has no diversity of parts in it; the same which is sensible is rational, and all her appetites are her wills. The error committed in making her act two several parts, which are usually contrary one to another, proceeds merely hence, that her functions have not been distinguished from them [sic] of the body, to which only all that can be observed in us repugnant to our reason ought to be attributed so that there is here no other contestation, unless that the little kernel in the middle of the brain, being driven on one side by the soul, and on the other by the animal spirits (which are only bodies, as I laid down before) it happens oftentimes that these two impulsions are contrary and that the strongest hinders the operation of the other. Now we may distinguish two sorts of motion excited by the spirits in the kernel: some represented to the soul the objects which move the senses, or the impressions found in the brain, which use not any violence on the will; others do use violence, to wit, such as cause the passions, or motions of the body concomitant with them. And for the first though they often times hinder the action of the soul, or else be hindered by it, yet by reason that they are not directly contrary, there is not any contestation observed in them. It is only taken notice of among the last, and the wills which resist them. For example, between that violence wherewith the spirits drive the kernel to cause in the soul a desire of anything and that wherewith the soul beats it back by the will she has to avoid the same thing. And what chiefly makes this contestation appear is that the will, having not the power to excite the passions directly (as has been already said), is constrained to use art and fall on considering successively divers things, if but one whereof chance to be strong enough to alter the course of the spirits one moment, it is possible that which follows is not and so the others may immediately resume it again, because the disposition preceding in the nerves, heart and blood is not changed which makes the soul feel herself instigated almost in the same instant to desire and not desire the very same thing. From hence it was that occasion was taken to imagine two contesting powers in her. Yet there may some kind of contestation be conceived herein, that oft times the same cause which excites some

passion in the soul excites also certain motions in the body whereunto the soul contributes not and which she stops or strives to stop as soon as ever she perceives them. As is then tried, when that which excited fearfulness causes also the spirits to enter into the muscles, that serve to stir the legs to run away and the will to be bold, stops them.

The 48th Article

Wherein the strength or weakness of souls is known, and what is the misery of the weakest.

Now it is by the successes of these contestations that every one may understand the strength or weakness of his soul. For those in whom the will can most easily conquer the passions, and stop the motions of the body that come along with them, have without doubt the strongest souls. But there are some who can never try their own strength, because they never let the will fight with her own weapons, but only with such as are borrowed from some passions to resist others. Those which I call her own weapons are firm and determinate judgements concerning the knowledge of good and evil according to which she has resolved to steer the actions of her life. And the weakest soul of all is such a one whose will has not at all determined to follow certain judgements, but suffers itself to be swayed with the present passions which being often contrary one to the other draw it backward and forwards to either side, and keeping her busy, in contesting against herself, put the soul into the most miserable estate she can be. As then, when fearfulness represents death as an extreme evil, which cannot be shunned but by flight. If, on the other side, ambition represents the infamy of this flight, as a mischief worse than death, these two passions variously agitate the will, which obeying now the one and then the other, continually opposes its own self, and yields up the soul to slavery and misfortune.

The 49th Article

That the strength of the soul is not enough without the knowledge of truth.

It is true, there are very few men so wake* and irresolute, that they will nothing but what their present passion dictates to them. The most part have determinate judgements according to which they regulate part of their actions. And though oft times these judgements be false, and indeed grounded on some passions, by which the will has formerly suffered herself to be vanquished, or seduced, yet because she perseveres in following them then when the passion that caused them is absent, they may be considered as her own weapons, and souls may be thought stronger or weaker according as they do more or less follow these judgements and resist the present passions contrary to them. But there is a great deal of difference between the resolutions proceeding from some false opinion, and those which are only held up by the knowledge of the truth. Since following these last, man is sure never to acquire sorrow or repentance, whereas following the first, they are inseparably companions, after the error is discovered.

*Old English form of “weak”.

The 50th Article

That there is no soul so weak, but well managed, may acquire an absolute mastery over her passions.

It will be commodious here to know that (as before has been said) although every motion of the kernel, seen to have been joined by nature to each of our thoughts even from the beginning of our life, they may yet be annexed to others by habits, as experience shows in words that excite motions in the kernel, which according to the institution of nature represent only to the soul their sound, when they are pronounced by the will; or by the figure of their letters when they are written and which yet never the less by a habit acquired by thinking what they signify, as soon as ever their sound is heard, or their letters seen, use to make us conceive the signification rather then the form of our letters or the sound of their syllables. It is also convenient to know that although the motions, as well of the kernel as the spirits and brain, which represent certain objects to the soul, be naturally joined with those that excite certain passions in her, yet they may by habit be separated, and annexed to others very different; and moreover that this habit may be acquired by one action only, and requires not a long usage. As when a man at unawares meets with any nasty thing in a dish of meat which he has a very good stomach to, this accident may so alter the disposition of the brain, that a man shall never afterwards see any such kind of meat without loathing, whereas before he took delight in eating it. The very same thing may be seen in beasts, for although they have no reason, nor it may be any thought, all the motions of the spirits and the kernel, which excite passions in us, yet are in them, and serve to foment and fortify (not as in us the passions but) the motions of the nerves and muscles their concomitants. So when a dog sees a partridge, he is naturally inclined to run to it and when he hears a piece go off, this noise incites him naturally to run away. Yet nevertheless, we ordinarily breed up spaniels so, that the fight of a partridge makes them couch and the noise of a discharged piece makes them run to it. Now these things are profitable to know, to encourage every one to study the regulation of his passions. For since with a little art the motions of the brain in beasts who are void of reason may be altered, it is evident they may more easily in men and that even those who have the weakest souls, may acquire a most absolute empire over all their passions, if art and industry be used to manage and govern them.

THE SECOND PART

Of the number and order of the passions, and explication of the six chief or primitive.

The 51st Article

What are the first causes of the passions.

It is known by what has formerly been said that the utmost and nearest cause of the passions of the soul is nothing but the agitation by which the spirits move the little kernel in the middle of the brain. But this is not sufficient to distinguish them from one another. It is necessary therefore to seek after their originals and examine their first causes. Now, although they may sometimes be caused by the action of the soul, which determines to conceive such or such objects, as also by the mere temper of the body, or by the impressions accidentally found in the brain, as it oft befalls that a man feels himself sad, or merry, not knowing upon what occasion, it appears nevertheless by what has been said, that the same may be excited also by the objects which move the senses, and that these objects are their most ordinary and principal causes. Whence it follows that to find them all out it is sufficient to consider all the effects of these objects.

The 52nd Article

What is the use of them and that they may be numbered.

Furthermore, I observe that the objects which move the senses excite not divers passions in us by reason of so many diversities in them, but merely because they may several ways hurt or profit us, or else, in general, be important to us. And, that the use of all the passions consists only in this, that they dispose the soul to will the things which nature dictates are profitable to us, and to persist in this will. As also the very agitation of the spirits, accustomed to cause them, dispose the body to the motions that further the execution of those things. Wherefore to calculate them, we are only to examine in order after how many considerable manners our senses may be moved by their objects. And I will here make a general muster of all the principal passions according to order, that so they may be found.

The 53rd Article

Admiration.

When the first encounter of any object surprises us, and we judge it to be new, or far different from what we knew before, or from what we supposed it should have been, we admire it, and are astonished at it. And because this may fall out before we know at all whether this object be convenient or no, me thinks admiration is the first of all the passions. And it has no contrary, because if the object presented have nothing in it that surprises us, we are not a whit moved at it, and we consider it without passions.

The 54th Article

Estimation, contempt, generosity or pride, and humility or dejection.

To admiration is annexed estimation or contempt according to the greatness or smallness of the object we admire. So too, we may either esteem of, or condemn ourselves, from whence come first the passions, afterwards, the habits of magnanimity or pride, and humility or dejection.

The 55th Article

Veneration and disdain.

But when we esteem or condemn other objects, which we consider as free causes capable to do either good or hurt, from estimation comes veneration and from mere contempt, disdain.

The 56th Article

Love and hatred.

Now, all the precedent passions may be excited in us, and we not [in] any way perceive whether the object that causes them is good or bad. But when a thing is represented to us as good in relation to us, that is, as being convenient for us, this breeds in us love to that. And when it is represented to us as evil or hurtful this excites hatred in us.

The 57th Article

Desire.

From the same consideration of good and evil arise all the passions, but to rank them in order, I distinguish of the time, and considering that they incline us more to look after the future than the present or past,* I begin with desire. For not only than when a man desires to acquire a good which he yet has not, or eschew an evil which he conceives may befall him, but when he desires only the conservation of a good, or the absence of an evil, which is as far as this passion can extend itself, it is evident that it always reflects upon the future.

* The original reads “part” rather than “past”.

The 58th Article

Hope, fear, jealousy, security and despair.

It is sufficient to think that the acquisition of a good, or the avoiding an evil, is possible to be incited to desire it. But when a man considers further whether there be much or small probability that he may obtain what he desires, that which represents much excites hope in us, and that which represents small excites fear, whereof jealousy is one sort. And when hope is extreme it changes its nature and is called security or assurance; as on the contrary, extreme fear becomes despair.

The 59th Article

Irresolution, courage, boldness, cowardice, affright.

And we may hope and fear, though the event we expect depends in no way on us. But when it is represented to us as depending on us, there may be a staggering about the election of means, or the execution of them. From the first proceeds irresolution, which disposes us to debate and take counsel. This last, courage or boldness opposes, whereof emulation is one sort. And cowardice is contrary to courage, as scaring or affright to boldness.

The 60th Article

Remorse.

And if a man were resolved on any action before the irresolution be taken off, that breeds remorse of conscience, which looks not on the time to come, as the other precedent passions, but the present or past.

The 61st Article

Joy and sadness.

And the consideration of a present good excites joy in us, that of an evil, sadness, when it is a good or an evil represented as belonging to us.

The 62nd Article

Derision, envy, pity.

But when it is represented to us as belonging to other men, we may either esteem them worthy or unworthy of them. And we esteem them worthy that excites in us no other passion but joy, seeing it is some good to us that we see things fall out as they should do. There is only this difference in it; the joy which comes from good is serious, whereas that

which proceeds from evil is accompanied with laughing and derision. But if we esteem them unworthy of it, the good excites envy, the bad pity, which are sorts of sadness. And it is to be noted that the same passions which relate to goods or evils present, may also oft-times relate to that which are to come, for as much as the opinion a man has that they will come, represents them as present.

The 63rd Article

Satisfaction of a man's self, and repentance.

We may also consider the cause of good or evil, as well present as past. And the good which has been done by us gives us an inward satisfaction, which is the sweetest of all the passions. Whereas evil excites repentance, which is the bitterest.

The 64th Article

Goodwill and gratitude.

But the good, which has been by others, causes us to bear goodwill to them, although it were not done to us. And if it be done to us, to goodwill we add gratitude.

The 65th Article

Indignation and wrath.

In the same manner, evil done by others, having no relation to us, breeds only in us indignation against them; and when it relates to us, it moves wrath also.

The 66th Article

Glory and shame.

Moreover, the good, which is or has been in us in reference to the opinion other men may have of it, excites glory in us; and the evil, shame.

The 67th Article

Distaste, sorrow, and lightheartedness.

And sometimes the continuance of a good causes weariness or distaste, whereas that of evil allays sorrow. Lastly, from good past proceeds discontent, which is a sort of sorrow;

and from evil past, lightheartedness a sort of joy.

The 68th Article

Wherefore this numeration of the passions is different from that commonly received.

This is the order which seems best to me for reckoning of the passions. Wherein, I know very well I digress from the opinion of all who have written before me. But I do it not without great cause. For they deduce their numeration thus: they distinguish in the sensitive parts of the soul two appetites, the one they call concupiscible, the other irascible. And because I understand not any distinction of parts in the soul (as I said before), me thinks it signifies nothing, unless that it has two faculties, one to desire, another to be angry. And because it has, in the same manner, faculties to admire, love, hope, fear, and also to admit into it every one of the other passions, or to do the actions whereunto these passions impel them, I see not what they meant by attributing them all to desire, or anger. Besides, their catalogue comprehends not all the principal passions, as, I believe, this does. I speak here only of the principal, because one might yet distinguish many more particular ones, and their number is indefinite.

The 69th Article

That there are but six primitive passions.

But the number of those which are simple and primitive is not very great. For do but review all those I have cast up, and it may easily be noted that there are but six such, to wit, admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness, and that all the other[s] are compounded of some of these six, or are sorts of them. Wherefore, that the multitude of them might not perplex the readers, I will here treat distinctly of the six primitive ones and afterwards show in what manner the rest derive their pedigree from them.

The 70th Article

Of admiration, the definition and cause of it.

Admiration is a sudden surprise of the soul, which causes in her an inclination to consider with attention the objects which seem rare and extraordinary to her. It is caused first by an imperfection in the brain that represents the object as rare, and consequently, worthy to be seriously considered. After that, by the motion of the spirits which are disposed by this impression to tend with might and main towards that place of the brain where it is, to fortify and conserve it there. As also they are thereby disposed to pass from thence into the muscles, which serve to hold the organs of the senses in the same situation they are, that it may be fomented by them, if it be by them that it was formed.

The 71st Article

That here happens no alteration in the heart, nor in the blood in this passion.

And this passion has this peculiar quality; it is observed not to be attended by any alteration in the heart, and the blood, as the other passions are, the reason whereof is, that having neither good nor evil for its object, but only the knowledge of the thing admired, it has no relation to the heart, and blood, on which depend all the good of the body, but only with the brain, where dwell the organs of the senses subservient to this knowledge.

The 72nd Article

Wherein consists the power of admiration.

This does not hinder it from being exceedingly powerful, notwithstanding the surprise, that is, the sudden, and unexpected arrival of the impression that alters the motion of the spirits: which surprise is proper, and peculiar to this passion: so that if at any time it does happen to any of the rest, as it usually does to all, and increases them, it is because admiration is joined with them. And, the power of it consists in two things, to wit, the novelty, and for that the motion which it causes, from the very beginning has its full strength. For it is certain such a motive is more operative than those which being weak at first, and growing but by little and little, may easily be diverted. Also, it is certain that those objects of the senses which are new touch the brain in certain parts where it used not to be touched, and that these parts being more tender, or less firm than those that frequent agitation has hardened, augments the operation of the motions which they excite there. [All of] which will not be deemed incredible, if it be considered, that is the like reason which causes the soles of our feet, accustomed to a pretty stubborn touch by the weight of the body they bear, but very little to feel this touch when we go; whereas another far lighter and softer (when they are tickled) is almost insupportable to us, only because it is not usual.

The 73rd Article

What astonishment is.

And this surprise has so much power to cause the spirits in the cavities of the brain to bend their course from thence to the place where the impression of the object admired is, that it sometimes drives them all thither and finds them such work to conserve this impression that there are none which pass from thence into the muscles, nor yet so much as deviate any way from the first tracts they followed into the brain. This causes all the body to be unmovable like a statue and that one can only perceive the first represented face of the object, and consequently not acquire any further knowledge of it. It is thus when a man is said to be astonished, for astonishment is an excess of admiration which can never be but evil.

The 74th Article

For what use the passions serve and what they are naught for.

Now, it is easy to gather by what has formerly been said that the utility of all the passions consists only in this; that they fortify and conserve in the soul those thoughts which are good for her and which may else be easily obliterated; as also all the discommodity they can cause consists in this, that they strengthen and maintain those thoughts more than is necessary, or fortify and conserve others which ought not to be fixed there.

The 75th Article

What is the peculiar use of admiration.

And it may be said peculiarly of admiration that it is as beneficial for causing us to apprehend and keep in memory things whereof we were formerly ignorant, for we admire nothing but what seems rare and extraordinary to us. And nothing can seem so to us, but because we were ignorant of it, or else at least because it differs from those things we knew before, for it is this difference that makes it be called extraordinary. Now although a thing unknown to us represent itself newly to our understanding, or our senses, we do not therefore retain it in memory unless the idea we have of it be fortified in our brain by some passion or other, or at least by application of our understanding, which our wills determines to a peculiar attention and reflection. And the rest of the passions may serve to make us observe things as they seem either good or evil. But we admire only those which seem rare. We see too that those who have no natural inclination to this passion are commonly very ignorant.

The 76th Article

Wherein it is hurtful and how the want of it may be supplied and the excess corrected.

But it falls out more often that a man admires too much and is astonished in perceiving things of little or no consideration than too little, and this may either absolutely take away or pervert the use of reason. Wherefore although it is good to be born with some kind of inclination to this passion because it disposes us to the acquisition of sciences, yet we ought afterwards to endeavour as much as we can to be rid of it. For it is easy to supply the want of it by a peculiar reflection and attention whereunto our will may always oblige our understanding, when we conceive the thing represented is worth the labour. But there is no remedy to cure excessive admiration but to acquire the knowledge of most things and to be exercised in the consideration of all such as may seem to be most rare and strange.

The 77th Article

That they are neither the most stupid, nor the men of greatest parts, who are most addicted to admiration.

Furthermore, although none, unless block-headed and stupid people, but are naturally addicted to admiration, I do not say that they who have the most wit are always most inclined to it, but chiefly those, who although they have a common sense good enough, have no great opinion of their sufficiency.

The 78th Article

That the excess of it may be translated to a habit for want of correction.

And although this passion seems to decrease by use because the more a man meets with rare things which he admires, the more he usually ceases to admire them and thinks those which may be presented to him afterwards but common. Yet when it is excessive and causes the attention to be fixed only on the first image of the objects represented not acquiring any farther knowledge, it leaves behind it a habit that disposes the soul to stop in the same manner on all other objects which present themselves, provided they appear never so little new. This prolongs the disease of those who are blindly inquisitive, that is, who seek out rarities only to admire them, and not to understand them, for by little and little they become so full of admiration, that things of no consequence are as apt to puzzle them, as those whose scrutiny is commodious.

The 79th Article

The definitions of love and hatred.

Love is an emotion of the soul caused by the motion of the spirits which incite it to join in will to the objects which seem convenient to her. And, hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul to will to be separated from objects represented, to be hurtful to her. I say these emotions are caused by the spirits to distinguish love and hatred which are passions and depend of the body, as well from the judgements that incline the soul to join in the will to the things she esteems good and separate from those she esteems evil, as from the emotions which these judgements alone excite in the soul.

The 80th Article

What is meant by joining or separating in will.

Furthermore, by the word will I do not mean here desire, which is a passion apart and relates to the future; that of the consent whereby he at that instant considers himself as it

were, joined to what he loves: so that he imagines a whole, whereof he thinks himself to be but one part, and the thing beloved another. As on the contrary, in hatred he considers himself alone as a whole, absolutely separated from the thing whereunto he has an aversion.

The 81st Article

Of the usual distinction between the love of concupiscence and benevolence.

It is frequent to distinguish that there are two sorts of love, one called benevolence, that is to say, wishing well to what a man loves; the other concupiscence, that is to say, which causes to desire the thing beloved. But me thinks this distinction belongs to the effects only, and not the essence of love. For as soon as a man is joined in will to any object, of what nature soever it be, he has a well-wishing to it. That is to say, he also thereunto joins in will the things he believes convenient for it, which is one of the main effects of love. And if he conceive it a good to possess it, or to be associated with him in any other manner than in will; he desires it, which is also one of the most ordinary effects of love.

The 82nd Article

How different passions concur in that they participate of love.

Nor is it necessary to distinguish as many sorts of love as there are diversity of objects which may be beloved. For example, although the passions of the ambitious man for glory, the avaricious for money, the drunkard for wine, the bestial for a woman he would violate, the man of honour for his friend or mistress, and a good father for his children, be in themselves very different, yet, in that they participate of love, they are alike. But the four first bear a love merely for the possession of the objects where unto their passion relates, and none at all to the objects themselves for which they have only a desire, mingled with other particular passions. Whereas the love a good father bears to his children is so pure that he desires to have nothing of them, and would not possess them any otherwise than he does, nor be joined nearer to them than he is already. But considering them as other selves, he seeks out their good as he would his own, or rather with more care, because representing to himself that he and they make but one whole, whereof he is not the better part, he oft-times prefers their interests before his own, and fears not his ruin to save them. The affections which men of honour bear to their friends is of this very same nature, though it seldom be so perfect; and that they bear to their mistress participates much of, but it has also a smatch* of the other.

* A taste, smack, flavour. [OED]

The 83rd Article

Of the difference between bare affection, friendship, and devotion.

Me thinks love may more justly be distinguished by the esteem a man makes of what he loves in comparison of himself. For when he values the object of his love less than himself, he bears only a bare affection to it. When he rates it equal with himself, it is called friendship. When more, that passion may be called devotion. Thus a man may bear an affection to a flower*, a bird, a horse, but unless he have a brain greatly out of tune, he cannot have friendship but for men. And they are so far the object of this passion, that there is no man so defective, but one may bear a perfect friendship to him, if one but think oneself beloved by him, and that one have a soul truly noble and generous; as shall accordingly be explained in the hundred fifty-forth, and hundred fifty-sixth article. As for devotion, the principal object thereof is undoubtedly the sovereign divinity, whereunto a man cannot choose but be devout. If he but understand it as he ought to do, but a man may carry a devotion to his prince too, to his country, to his city, and even to a particular man, when he esteems him much more than himself. Now, the difference betwixt these three sorts of love appears chiefly by their effects: for since in all of them a man considers himself as joined and united to the things beloved, he is ever ready to abandon the least part of all, which to conserve the other, he atones therewith. Therefore, in bare affection he always prefers himself before what he loves; and contrariwise in devotion he so much prefers the thing before himself that he fears not to die for the conservation of it. Whereof we have seen frequent examples of those who have exposed themselves to a certain death for the defense of their prince, or their city, and sometimes too, of particular persons to whom they have been devoted.

* Original text reads “flow”.

The 84th Article

That there are not so many sorts of hatred as love.

Furthermore, although hate is directly opposite to love, yet it is not distinguished into so many sorts because a man observes not so much the difference between the evils a man is separated from in will, as he does between the goods whereunto he is joined.

The 85th Article

Of liking and horror.

And I find only one considerable distinction alike in each. It consists in this, that the objects as well of love as hatred, may be represented to the soul by the exterior senses or else by the interior, and one’s own reason. For we commonly call that good or evil, which our interior senses or* reason makes us judge convenient for, or contrary to our nature. But we call that handsome or ugly, which is so represented to us by our exterior senses, chiefly by the sight, which alone is more considered than all the rest. From whence arise

two sorts of love: that which a man bears to good things; and that he bears to handsome things, whereunto we may give the name of liking, that we may not confound it with the other, nor yet with desire, whereunto the name of love is often attributed. And from hence spring, in the same manner, two forms of hatred, one whereof relates to things evil, the other to ugly. And this last, for distinction sake, may be called horror, or aversion. But the most observable thing herein is that these passions of liking and horror are usually more violent than the other kinds of love and hatred because that which comes to the soul by the senses touches more to the quick than what is represented by her reason. And yet most commonly they have less truth. So that of all the passions, these are the greatest cheaters whom a man ought most carefully to beware of.

* Original reads “our.”

The 86th Article

The definition of desire.

The passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which disposes it to will hereafter the things that she represents unto herself convenient. So a man not only desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of a present, and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures as that which he believes may befall him hereafter.

The 87th Article

That it is a passion which has no contrary.

I know very well that in the schools, that passion which tends to the seeking after good, which only is called desire, is opposed to that which tends to the avoiding of evil, which is called aversion. But seeing there is no good, the privation whereof is not an evil, nor any evil taken in the notion of a positive thing the privation whereof is not good. For example, that in seeking after riches, a man necessarily eschews poverty; in avoiding diseases, he seeks after health; and so of the rest. Me thinks it is still the same motion which inclines to the seeking after good, and with all, to the avoiding evil, which is contrary to it, I only observe this difference, that the desire he has, when he tends towards some good, and withal, to the avoiding evil, which is contrary to it. I only observe this difference, that the desire he has when he tends towards some good is accompanied with love and afterwards with hope and joy. Whereas the same desire, when he tends to the avoiding an evil contrary to this good, is attended with hatred, fear, and sorrow, which is the reason why it is conceived contrary to itself. But if it be considered when it relates equally at the same time to a good sought after, and an opposite evil to shun it, it may be clearly perceived but one passion only which causes both the one and the other.

The 88th Article

What are the several kinds of it.

It is more fit to distinguish desire into as many several sorts as there are several objects sought after. For example, curiosity, which is nothing but a desire to know, differs much from the desire of glory, and this from the desire of revenge, and so of the rest. But it is enough here to know that there are as many sorts of it as of love or hatred, and that the most considerable and strongest desires are those which are derived from liking and loathing.

The 89th Article

What is the desire arising from horrors.

Now, although it is but one self-same desire which tends to the seeking after good and avoiding its contrary, evil, as has been said already. Yet the desire springing from liking ceases not to be very different from that which arises from horror, for this liking and this horror, which are in truth two contraries, are not the good and the evil which serve for objects to these desires, but only two emotions of the soul, which dispose it to seek after two very different things. Horror is instituted by nature to represent a sudden and unexpected death to the soul, so that if it is sometimes no more but the touch of a little worm, the noise of a shaking leaf, or one’s own shadow that causes horror, a man immediately feels as great an emotion, as if a most evident danger of death were laid before his eyes. This causes a sudden agitation, which inclines the soul to employ all her strength to shun an evil, if present; and it is this kind of desire which is commonly called flight or aversion.

The 90th Article

What is that arising from liking.

On the contrary, liking is peculiarly instituted by nature to represent the enjoyment of what is liked, as the greatest good belonging to man, which causes a man very earnestly to desire this enjoyment. It is true, there are several sorts of liking, and the desires which arise from them are not all alike in power. For example, the loveliness of flowers incite us only to look on them, and that of fruits to eat them. But the chief is that which proceeds from the perfections a man imagines in another person, which he thinks may become another self. For with the distinction of sexes, which nature has bestowed on man as well as irrational creatures, she has also put certain impressions in the brain, which makes a man at a certain age, and at a certain season to look on himself as defective. And as if he were but the half of a whole, whereof a person of the other sex ought to be the other half, so that the acquisition of this half is represented to us confusedly by nature, as the greatest of all imaginable goods. And although he sees many persons of the other sex, he does not

therefore desire many at the same time. By reason nature makes him conceive that he has need of no more but one half. But when he observes something in anyone that likes him better than anything he has marked at the same time in the rest, that fixes the soul to feel all the inclination which nature has given him to seek after the good, that she represents to him as the greatest he can possibly possess on that woman only. And this inclination, or this desire which is bred thus by liking, is called by the name of love, more commonly than the passion of love formerly described. Indeed it has much more strange effects, and this is he that furnishes all the writers of romances and poets with stuff.

The 91st Article

The definition of joy.

Joy is a pleasing emotion of the soul, wherein consists her enjoyment of good that the impressions of the brain represent unto her as her own. I say, in this emotion consists the enjoyment of good, for in truth the soul receives no other fruit of all the good she possesses. And when there is no joy in her, a man may say she enjoys it no more then if she had not any. I also add, it is of that good which the impressions of the brain represent to her as her own that I may not confound this joy, which is a passion, with that joy purely intellectual, which comes into the soul by the sole action of the soul, and which may be called a pleasing emotion in her, excited by herself, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, which her understanding represents to her as her own. It is true, while the soul is joined to the body, this intellectual joy can hardly be rid of the company of that which is a passion. For as soon as ever our understanding perceives that we possess any good, although this good may be so far different from all that belongs to the body that it be not imaginable, yet will not the imagination forbear to make immediately some impression in the brain, whereupon ensue the motion of the spirits which excite the passion of joy.

The 92nd Article

The definition of sadness.

Sadness is an unpleasant languishing, wherein consists the discommodity the soul receives from evil, or defect, which the impressions of the brain represent unto her, as belonging to her. And there is also an intellectual sadness, which is not the passion, but which wants but little of being accompanied by it.

The 93rd Article

What are the causes of these two passions.

Now, when the intellectual joy or sadness so excites that which is a passion, their cause is evident enough. And one may see by their definitions that joy comes from the opinion a

man has that he possesses some good, and sadness from the opinion of some evil, or defect. But it oft falls out, that a man is sad or joyful, and yet he cannot distinctly observe the good or evil which are the cause of it. To wit, when this good or this evil make their impressions in the brain without the intercourse of the soul, sometimes because they belong only to the body, and sometimes too, although they belong to the soul, because she considers them not as good or evil, but under some other notion, the impression whereof is joined in the brain with that of good and evil.

The 94th Article

How the passions are excited by goods and evils which only respect the body; and wherein consists tickling and pain.

So, when a man is in sound health, and the weather is fairer than ordinary, he feels a lightsomeness in himself, which proceeds not from any function of the understanding, but only from the impressions which the motion of the spirits makes in the brain. And he feels himself sad likewise, when his body is indisposed, although he know not that it is. Thus, the tickling of the senses is so closely followed by joy, and pain by sadness, that most men cannot distinguish them, yet, they differ so far, that a man may sometimes suffer pains with joy, and receive ticklings that displease. But the cause why joy commonly follows tickling is because all that is called tickling, or a pleasing touch, consists in this, that the objects of the senses excite some motions in the nerves, which would be apt to hurt them if they had not strength enough to resist it or the body were not well disposed, which makes an impression in the brain, which being instituted by nature, to signify this good disposition, and this strength, represents it to the soul as a good belonging to her, seeing she is united to the body, and so excites joy in her. The cause is almost the same why a man naturally takes delight to feel himself moved to all sorts of passions, yea, even sadness, and hatred, when these passions are caused only by strange adventures, which he sees personated on a stage, or by such like occasion, which not being capable to trouble us any way, seem to tickle the soul by touching it. And the reason why pain usually produces sadness is because that feeling which is called pain proceeds always from some action, so violent that it offends the nerves. So that being instituted by nature to signify to the soul the damage the body receives by this action, and its weakness in not being able to resist it, it represents each of them to him, as evils always displeasing, unless then when they cause some good things, which she esteems of more than them.

The 95th Article

How they may also be excited by goods and evils which the soul observes not, though they belong to her, as the delight a man takes to run into a danger, or remember an evil past.

So the delight which oft-times young men take to undertake difficult things, and expose themselves to great perils, though they do not so much as look for any profit or honour

thereby, comes from hence: the conceit they have that they undertake a difficult thing makes an impression in the brain, which being joined to that which they may make, if they thought it a good thing to be courageous, fortunate, active, or strong enough to dare to hazard so far, is the reason that they take delight in it. And the content which old men take, when they remember the miseries they suffered, proceeds from hence: they imagine to themselves it is a good thing that they could subsist in spite of them.

The 96th Article

What are the motions of the blood and spirits that cause the five preceding passions.

The five passions which I have here begun to explain are so joined, or opposed to one another, that it is easier to consider them all together than to treat distinctly of each, as I handled admiration. And their cause is not like that—in the brain only—but also in the heart, spleen, liver, and all other parts of the body, in as much as they serve to the production of the blood, and afterwards of the spirits. For although all the veins convey the blood they contain into the heart, yet it sometimes falls out, that the blood of some of them is driven with a stronger force than the rest, and it happens also that the overtures through which it enters into the heart, or those through which it goes out, are more dilated or contracted one time than another.

The 97th Article

The principal experiments conducing to the knowledge of these motions in love.

Now considering the sundry alterations that experience lets us see in our bodies while our soul is agitated with divers passions, I observe in love when it is alone, that is, when it is not accompanied with any extreme joy, desire or sadness, that the beating of the pulse is even, & much greater and stronger than ordinary; that a man feels a gentle heart in his breast, and quick digestion of meat; so that this passion is profitable for the health.

The 98th Article

In hatred.

On the contrary, I observe in hatred that the pulse is uneven, weaker, and oftentimes faster, that a man feels colds intermingled with (I know not what) sharp and pricking heat in the breast, that the stomach ceases to do its office, is inclined to vomit and reject the meats he has eaten, or at least corrupt them and convert them into ill humours.

The 99th Article

In joy.

In joy, that the pulse is even and quicker than ordinary, but not so strong, nor so great as in love, and that a man feels a pleasant heat, which is not only in the breast, but spreads itself over all the exterior parts of the body with the blood, which is seen to flow abundantly thither. And meanwhile, he sometimes loses his appetite because the digestion is less than usual.

The 100th Article

In sadness.

In sadness, that the pulse is weak and slow, and that a man feels, as it were, strings about his heart, which bind it close, and icicles that freeze it and communicate their cold to the rest of the body. Yet in the meanwhile he has sometimes a good appetite, and feels his stomach not failing of its duty, provided there be no hatred mingled with the sadness.

The 101st Article

In desire.

Lastly, I observe this peculiar in desire, that it agitates the heart more violently than any of the other passions, and furnishes the brain with more spirits—which passing from thence into the muscles, make all the senses quicker, and all parts of the body more agile.

The 102nd Article

The motion of the blood and spirits in love.

There observations, and many more too long to insert, gave me occasion to conceive that when the understanding represents to itself any object of love, the impression which this thought makes in the brain conveys the animal spirits through the nerves of the sixth pair to the muscles about the intestines and the stomach, in the manner requisite to make the juice of meats, which convert into new blood, pass suddenly to the heart without any demure in the liver, and which being driven thither with greater force than that which is in the rest of the body, it gets in thither in more abundance, and excites a stronger heat. By reason it [the new blood] is thither than that which already has been often rarified by passing and repassing through the heart, which also causes it to send spirits to the brain, whose parts are grosser, and more agitated than ordinary. And these spirits fortifying the impression that the first thought of the object beloved, stuck there, bind the soul to fix upon the thought; and herein consists the passion of love.

The 103rd Article

In hatred.

Contrariwise, in hatred the first thought of the object that breeds aversion so conveys the spirits in the brain to the muscles of the stomach and intestines that they hinder the juice of meats from mixing with the blood, by contracting up all the passages through which it is used to run, and so conveys it to the small nerves of the spleen and the lower part of the liver, where the receptacle of choler is, that those parts of the blood which use[d] to be cast out to those places, get out and run with that in the branches of the hollow vein to the heart, which causes much inequality in the heat of it, seeing the blood that comes from the spleen is not heated nor rarified but with much difficulty. And on the other side that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is inflamed and dilated suddenly, by which consequence spirits that go to the brain have parts very unequal, and motions very unusual. From whence it comes that they there fortify the idea of hatred already imprinted and incline the souls to thoughts full of rancor and bitterness.

The 104th Article

In joy.

In joy, not only the nerves of the spleen, liver, stomach or intestines act, but those in the rest of the body; and particularly that about the orifices of the heart, which opening and dilating these orifices, enables the blood which the rest of the nerves have driven from the veins to the heart, to get in there and issue forth in greater quantity than ordinary. And because the blood which then gets into the heart has often passed and repassed through it, coming from the arteries into the veins, it easily dilates and produces spirits, whose parts being very equal and subtle, are fit to form and fortify the impressions of the brain, which deal lively and quiet thoughts to the soul.

The 105th Article

In sadness.

Contrariwise, in sadness the orifices of the heart are hugely straightened by the small nerve that environs them, and the blood of the veins is no whit agitated, which causes but very little to go to the heart. And in the meanwhile the passages through which the juice of meats glides from the stomach and entrails to the liver are open, wherefore the appetite diminishes not, unless hatred, which is an ordinary companion of sadness, close them.

The 106th Article

In desire.

Lastly, the passion of desire has the peculiar property that the will a man has to attain any good or avoid any evil sends the spirits of the brain immediately to all the parts of the body that may serve any ways to actions requisite to that purpose and particularly to the heart, and those parts which supply it with blood most. That receiving it in greater abundance than ordinary, it sends a greater number of spirits to the brain, as well to maintain and fortify the idea of this will as to pass from thence into all the organs of the senses, and all the muscles which may be set on work, to attain what one desires.

The 107th Article

What is the cause of these motions in love.

And I deduce the reason of all this from what has formerly been said, that there is such a tie betwixt our soul and body that when we have joined any corporeal action with any thought, one of them never presents itself to us afterwards, without the other. As may be seen in such who with much aversion, when they have been sick, have taken some drink. They can neither eat nor drink afterwards but they have the same aversion. Nay further, they cannot think of their aversion to medicines, but the very same taste comes into their thought. For methinks the first passions our soul admitted when she was first joined to our body came from hence, that sometimes the blood, or some other juice which got into the heart, was an alimony more convenient than ordinary to maintain heat there, which is the principle of life. This caused the soul to join in will to this alimony, that is, to love it. And at the same time the spirits trickled from the brain into the muscles, which might press or agitate the parts from whence it came to the heart, that they might send more of it thither. And these parts were the stomach, and entrails, whose agitation augments the appetite, or else the liver, and lungs which the muscles of the diaphragm may press. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits ever since accompanies the passion of love.

The 108th Article

In hatred.

Sometimes, on the contrary, some strange juice came to the heart, which was not good to cherish the heat of it, or which else might extinguish it. Wherefore the spirits, which ascended from the heart to the brain, excited in the soul the passion of hatred. And at the same time also, these spirits went from the brain to the nerves which might drive the blood from the spleen and the small veins of the liver, to the heart to hinder this noxious juice from getting in, and more, to those which might repel this juice to the entrails and the stomach, or else, sometimes to make the stomach disgorge it. From whence it comes, that the same motions are used to accompany the passion of hatred. And in the liver one may discern by the eye that there are in the liver an abundance of veins or pipes, indifferent broad, through which the juice of meats may pass from the port-vein into the hollow-vein, and from thence to the heart, without stopping any whit at the liver, but that there are also an infinite number of ones where it may stop, which always contain a reserve of blood, as

the spleen does too; which blood being thicker than that which is in the other parts of the body, may better serve for nutriment to the fire in the heart, when the stomach and entrails lack wherewithal to supply them.

The 109th Article

In joy.

It has also come to pass at the beginning of our life, that the blood contained in the veins was an alimony sufficiently convenient to maintain the heat of the heart, and they contained so great an abundance of it, that there was no need to exhaust nutriment elsewhere. This has excited in the soul the passion of joy. And at the same time has caused the orifices of the heart to be more open than ordinary; and that the spirits trickling abundantly from the brain, not only into the nerves which serve to open theses orifices, but also universally into all the rest which drive the blood of the veins to the heart, hinder any from coming afresh from the liver, spleen, entrails, and stomach. Wherefore these very same motions accompany joy.

The 110th Article

In sadness.

Sometimes, on the contrary, it has happened that the body has wanted nutriment, and this has made the soul feel her first sadness, at least that which has not been joined with hatred. This very thing has also caused the orifices of the heart to be contracted because they received but little blood. And, that a good quantity of this blood came from the spleen, by reason that is as the last reserve which serves to supply the heart, when there comes none to it from any where else. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits and nerves, which so serve to contract the orifices of the heart, and to convey the blood thither from the spleen, always accompany sadness.

The 111th Article

In desire.

Lastly, all the original desires which the soul might have when it was newly joined to the body, were to admit things convenient for her and repel hurtful. And it was for the same purpose, that, from that instant, the spirits began to move all the muscles, and all the organs of the senses, in all manners that they could move. Which is the reason that now, when the soul desires anything, the whole body becomes more active and disposed to move than usually without it, and then it falls out, on the other side that the body is so disposed, then are the desires of the soul more strong and vehement.

The 112th Article

What are the exterior signs of these passions.

What I have laid down here makes the differences of the pulse, and all the other properties which I have here before attributed to these passions, be sufficiently understood, so that I need not stand any further to explain them. But because I have only observed in each what may be remarkable only when it is single, and what shows to know the motions of the blood and spirits that produce them, it yet remains that I should treat on divers exterior signs, which usually accompany them, and which may be better noted when many of them are mixed together, as ordinarily they are, than when they are distinct. The chief of these signs are the gestures of the eyes and face, changes of colour, tremblings, languishing, swooning, laughter, tears, groans, and sighs.

The 113th Article

Of the gestures of the eyes and face.

There is no passion but* some particular gesture of the eyes declare it. And it is so palpable in some that even the stupidest serving-men, by the eye of their master, observe whether he be angry with them or not. But though a man may easily perceive these gestures of the eyes, and know what they signify, yet it is not an easy matter to describe them, because every one of them is composed of several alterations, which happen in the motion, and figure of the eye, which are so peculiar, and so small, that each of them cannot be discerned distinctly, though the result of their conjunction be said of the gestures of the face, which thus accompany the passions. For though they be greater than those of the eyes, yet it is difficult to distinguish them, and they so little differ, that there are men almost of the same aspect when they weep, as others when they laugh. It is true, there are some very remarkable, as the wrinkling of the forehead in wrath, and certain motions of the nose, and lips in indignation and derision. But they seem rather to be voluntary than natural. And generally, all the gestures as well of the face as eyes may be altered by the soul, when being willing to conceal her passion, she strongly imagines one contrary to it, so that they may serve as well counterfeit, as declare passions.

*“But” in the sense of unless.

The 114th Article

Of changing colour.

A man cannot so easily refrain from blushing or looking pale when any passion disposes him thereunto, because these changes depend not on the nerves and muscles as the former, and because they come more immediately from the heart, which may be called the source of the passions seeing it prepares the blood and spirits to produce them. Now it is certain

that the colour of the face comes from nought but the blood, which flowing continually from the heart through the arteries into all the veins, and from all the veins into the heart, colours the face, more or less, according as it more or less fills the little veins towards the superficies thereof.

The 115th Article

How joy causes blushing.

So joy renders the colour livelier, and more vermilion, because by opening the sluices of the heart, it makes the blood flow quicker in all the veins, and becoming hotter, and more subtle, it moderately raises up all parts of the face, which makes the aspect of it more smiling and brisk.

The 116th Article

How sadness makes one look pale.

On the contrary, sadness, by contracting the orifices of the heart, makes the blood flow more slowly into the veins, and that becoming colder and thicker has not need of so much room; so that retreating into the largest, which are nearest the heart, it deserts the remotest. The most apparent whereof being those of the face, that makes it look pale and wan, especially when the sadness is great, or comes upon one suddenly, as is seen in affrights, whose surprisals augment the action that obstructs the heart.

The 117th Article

How a man looks red oft-times when he is sad.

But it oft-times befalls, that a man does not wax pale when he is sad, but contrarily becomes red. This ought to be attributed to other passions joined to sadness, to wit, love, desire, and sometimes, even hatred too. For these passions, heating or agitating the blood which comes from the liver, entrails, and the rest of the interior parts, drive it to the heart, and from thence through the great artery to the veins of the face. The sadness which obstructs the orifices of the heart on each side not being able to hinder it, unless when it is mighty excessive; but when it is only moderate, it easily hinders the blood to come into the veins of the face from descending into the heart, while love, desire, or hatred drive other thither from the interior parts. Wherefore, this blood being settled about the face, makes it look red; and indeed, redder than in joy, because the colour of the blood appears so much the better, as it flows quicker, and also because more blood can then get up into the veins of the face then when the orifices of the heart are more open. This is more palpable in shame, which is compounded of self-love, and an earnest desire to shun present infamy, which causes the blood to come from the interior parts to the heart; from

thence through the arteries into the face; and withal, of a moderate sadness, which hinders this blood from returning to the heart. The same is also seen ordinarily when a man weeps; for, as I shall say hereafter, it is love joined to sadness, which, for the most part causes tears, it appears also in anger, or oft-times an eager desire of revenge mixed with love, hatred, and sadness.

The 118th Article

Of tremblings.

Tremblings have two several causes: one is, that there come sometimes too few spirits from the brain into the nerves; the other, that there come sometimes too many, so that the little passages of the muscles cannot be duly shut, which as has been said in the eleventh Article, ought to be shut to determine the motion of the members. The chief cause of it appears to be in sadness and fearfulness; as also when a man shakes with cold. For these passions, as well as the cold of the air, may so thicken the blood that it may not furnish the brain with spirits enough to send any into the nerves. The other cause appears often in those who ardently desire anything, and in those who are moved with wrath, as also in these who are drunk, for these two passions, as well as wine, sometimes make so many spirits go into the brain that they cannot regularly be conveyed from thence into the muscles.

The 119th Article

Of languishing.

Languishing is a disposition to ease one’s self, and be without motion, which is felt in all the members. It comes as trembling because there are not spirits enough in the nerves, but in a different manner, for the cause of trembling is that there are not enough in the brain to obey the determinations of the kernel when that drives them to any muscle. Whereas languishing proceeds from hence, that the kernel does not determine them to go to some muscles rather [than] others.

The 120th Article

How it is caused by love and by desire.

And the passion which most commonly causes this effect is love joined to the desire of a thing, the acquisition whereof is not imagined possible for the present time for love so busies the soul in considering the object beloved that it employs all the spirits which are in the brain to represent the image of it to her, and stops all the motions of the kernel not subservient to this purpose. And it is to be noted concerning desire that the property which I have attributed to it, of rendering the body more active, agrees not to it, but when a man

imagines the object desired to be such, that he may from that very time do something which may serve to acquire it. For if, on the other side, he imagines it is impossible for him at that time to do anything that may conduce thereunto, all the agitation of desire remains in the brain, not at all passing into the nerves; and being wholly employed in fortifying the idea of the object desired there, leaves the rest of the body languishing.

The 121st Article

That it may also be caused by other passions.

It is true that hatred, sadness, yes, and joy too, may cause some kind of languishing too when they are very violent: because they wholly busy the soul in considering their objects, chiefly when the desire of a thing, to the acquisition whereof a man cannot contribute anything for the present, is joined with them. But because he fixes more on the consideration of the objects which he has joined in will to himself than those which he has separated, or any else; and because languishing depends not on a surprise but requires some time to be formed, it is more frequently found in love than any other passion.

The 122nd Article

Of swooning.

There is not much difference betwixt swooning and death for a man dies when the fire in his heart is utterly extinguished; and he falls in a swoon only when it is smothered, so that there remains only some residue of heat that may afterwards be kindled again. Now, there are divers indispositions of the body which may make a man fall to fainting, thus. But among the passions, none but extreme joy is observed to have this power. And the manner whereby I suppose it works its effect is thus: opening extraordinarily the orifices of the heart, the blood of the veins does so huddle in, and in so abundant a quantity that it cannot there be rarified by the heat soon enough to lift up the little skins that shut the entries of those veins; by which means it smothers the fire which it used to feed when it came into the heart in fit proportion.

The 123rd Article

Wherefore a man does not swoon with sadness.

One would think that a great sadness, unexpectedly falling, might so shut the orifices of the heart that it might extinguish the fire. But yet that is not observed to happen, or if it do, very rarely. The reason whereof, I believe, is that there can scarce be so little blood in the heart, but that it is sufficient to maintain the heat when the orifices thereof are almost locked up.

The 124th Article

Of Laughter.

Laughter consists in this, that the blood which comes from the right cavity of the heart by the arterial vein, blowing up the lungs suddenly and at several fits, constrains the air they contain to break out impetuously through the gullet, where it forms an inarticulate and clattering sound. And as well, the lungs by their blowing and this air by breaking forth, shove all the muscles of the diaphragm, breast, and throat, by which means they cause those of the face, which have some connection with them, to move. And it is only this gesture of the face with this inarticulate and clattering voice that is called laughter.

The 125th Article

Wherefore it does not accompany the greatest joys.

Now, though laughter may seem to be one of the chief signs of joy, yet this cannot cause that, but only when that is mean, and that there be some little admiration or hatred mixed with it. For it is found by experience that when a man is extraordinary[ly] joyful, the occasion of this joy never makes him break out into laughter. And besides, he can never be so easily invited to it as when he is sad; the reason whereof is, that in the greatest joys the lungs are continually so full of blood that they cannot be blown up any more by fits.

The 126th Article

What are the chief causes of it.

And I can mark but two causes which blow up the lungs thus suddenly. The first is a surprisal of admiration, which being joined to joy may so quickly open the orifices of the heart that a great abundance of blood, getting in all together at the right side of it through the hollow vein, is rarified there and passing from thence through the arterial vein, blows up the lungs. The other is the mixture of some liquor that augments the rarefaction of the blood; and I find none fit for that purpose but the wheyest* part of that which comes from the spleen, which part of the blood being driven to the heart by some light emotion of hatred, assisted by a surprise of admiration and mixing there with the blood which comes from the other parts of the body, which joy causes to enter in thither abundantly, may cause this blood to dilate much more than usual, as we see many liquors swell up over the fire, if one fling but a little vinegar into the vessel where they are. For the wheyest* part of the blood which comes from the spleen is of a nature like vinegar. Experience also shows us that in all rencounters producing this loud laughter, which comes from the lungs, there is still some little occasion of hatred, or at least of admiration, and those whose spleens are not found are subject not only to be more sad, but by intervals more merry and disposed to laughter than others. For as much as the spleen sends two sorts of blood to the heart, one thick and gross, which causes sadness, the other, exceeding[ly] fluid and subtle which

causes joy. And oft-times, after much laughter a man feels himself naturally inclined to sadness because the most fluid part of the blood of the spleen being exhausted, the grosser follows it to the heart.

*“Whey” is the watery part of milk that remains liquid when the rest forms curds, so the “wheyest” part of the blood would be that most fluid part.

The 127th Article

What is the cause thereof in indignation.

For that kind of laughter which sometimes accompanies indignation, it is usually artificial and feigned. But when it is natural, it seems to come from the joy a man has to see he cannot be hurt by the evil whereat he is offended, and withal, that he finds himself surprised by the novelty, or the unexpected encounter of this evil. So that joy, hatred, and admiration contribute to it. Yet I will suppose that it may be produced without any joy, by the mere motion of aversion, which sends the blood from the spleen to the heart, where it is rarified and thrust from thence into the lungs, which it easily blows up when it finds them empty. And generally, whatsoever suddenly blows up the lungs in this manner causes the exterior action of laughter, except when sadness alters it into groans and shrieks that accompany tears. Vives 3 de Anima, cap: de Risu, writes of himself (which is very pertinent to this) that when he had been a long time fasting, the first bits he put in his mouth made him laugh, which might come from hence; his lungs empty of blood for want of nutriment, was suddenly blown up by the first juice that passed from his stomach to his heart; or else the mere imagination of eating might convey it thither, even before that of the meat might get thither.

The 128th Article

Of the original of tears.

As laughter is never caused by the greatest joys, so tears proceed not from an extreme sadness but an indifferent one, and that accompanied with, or followed by some resentment of love, or also of joy. And to understand their original well, it must be noted that although abundance of vapours continually issue forth from whence there comes so much as from the eyes, by reason of the greatness of the optic nerves, and the multitude of little arteries through which they come. And that as sweat is made of the vapours, which issuing out of the other parts convert into water on the superficies of them, so tears are made of vapours issuing from the eyes.

The 129th Article

Of the manner how vapours turn into water.

Now as I have written in the Meteors, explaining after what manner the vapours of the air convert into rain, that it proceeds from their being less agitated, or more abundant than ordinary. So I believe that when those that issue from the body are far less agitated than usual, although they are not so abundant, yet they may convert to water-which causes the cold sweats that sometimes proceed of weakness when a man is sick. And I believe that when they are more abundant, provided they be not withal more agitated, they also convert into water; this causes sweat when one uses exercise. But then the eyes sweat not, because while the body is exercised the greatest parts of the spirits going into the muscles which serve to move it there go less through the optic nerve to the eyes. And it is but the same matter which compounds the blood in the veins or arteries, and the spirits, when it is in the brain, nerves, or muscle, and vapours when it issues out in the likeness of air, and lastly, sweat [or] tears when it thickens into water on the superficies of the body or eyes.

The 130st Article

How that which hurts the eye excites it to weep.

And I can see but two causes that make the vapours, issuing from the eyes, to change into tears. The first is when the figure of the pores, through which they pass, is changed by any accident whatsoever. For that, retarding the motion of these vapours and altering their order, may cause them to convert into water. So, there needs [to be] only a straw in the eye to draw out some tears, by reason that exciting pain in it, it alters the disposition of the pores so that some becoming more narrow, the small parts of the vapours pass less quickly through it; and whereas formerly they issued out equally distant the one from the other, and so where separated they come to meet because the order of these pores is molested by which means they join together and so convert to tears.

The 131st Article

How one weeps for sadness.

The other cause is sadness, followed by love, or joy, or generally by any cause, which makes the heart thrust much blood into the arteries. Sadness is requisite thereunto because, making the blood cold, it contracts the pores of the eyes. But because, according as it contracts them, it also decreases the quantity of vapours, whereunto they should allow passage, that is not yet sufficient to produce tears unless the quantity of vapours be at the same time augmented by some other cause. And there is nothing that increases it more than the blood sent from the heart in the passion of love. We see also, that they who are sad do not continually shed tears, but only by intervals when they make any new reflection on the objects they affect.

The 132nd Article

Of the groans which accompany tears.

And then, sometimes, the lungs too are blown up all at once by the abundance of blood which gets into them and drives away the air they contained, which breaking forth through the gullet, begets groans and cries which usually accompany tears. And these cries are commonly more sharp than those which accompany laughter, though they be produced almost in the same manner. The reason whereof is that the nerves which serve to enlarge or contract the organs of the voice to make it stronger or sharper, being joined to those which open the orifices of the heart in joy, and contract them in sadness, cause these organs to be dilated or contracted at the same time.

The 133rd Article

Wherefore children and old men are most apt to weep.

Children and old men are more apt to weep than they of a middle age, but for several reasons. Old men weep oft-times out of affection and for joy. For these two passions joined together send much blood to the heart, and from thence many vapours to the eyes. And the agitation of these vapours is so retarded by their natural coldness that they are apt to convert into tears although no sadness preceded. But if some old men are apt to weep for vexation too, it is not so much the temper of their body as that of their mind, which disposes them thereunto. And this befalls only those who are so weak that they suffer themselves to be absolutely overcome by small occasions of grief, fear, or pity. The same happens to children, who do not weep commonly for joy, but rather for sadness, that unaccompanied with love. For they ever have blood enough to produce many vapours, the motion of which being retarded by sadness, they convert into tears.

The 134th Article

Wherefore some children wax pale instead of weeping.

Yet there are some who wax pale instead of weeping when they are vexed, which may denote an extraordinary judgement and courage in them. That is, when it proceeds from the consideration of the greatness of the evil, they prepare themselves for a strong resistance, as they do who are elder. But it is ordinarily a mark of an ill nature; that is, when it proceeds from their inclination to hatred, or fear follow, for they are passions that diminish the matter of tears. And on the contrary, it is seen that those who are prone to weep are inclined to love and pity.

The 135th Article

Of sighs.

The cause of sighs is very different from that of tears, though it, like them, presupposes sadness. For whereas a man is excited to weep when the lungs are full of blood, he is incited to sigh when they are almost empty and when some imagination of hope, or joy opens the orifice of the venous artery which sadness had contracted because then the small remainder of blood in the lungs, falling all together into the left side of the heart through this venous artery, and driven on by a desire to attain this joy, which at the same time agitates all the muscles of the diaphragm and breast, the air is suddenly blown through the mouth into the lungs to fill up the vacant place of the blood. And this is called sighing.

The 136th Article

From whence proceed the passions which are peculiar to certain men.

Furthermore, that I may here in few words supply all that may be added hereunto concerning the several effects or causes of the passions, I am content to repeat the principle, whereon all that I have written of them is grounded: to wit, that there is such a tie betwixt our soul and body that when we once have joined any corporeal action with any thought, one of them never presents itself to us without the other; and that they are not always the same actions which are joined to the same thoughts. For this is sufficient to give a reason of all that any man can observe peculiar, either in himself or others, concerning this matter, which has not been here explained. And for example, it is easy to conceive that the strange aversions of some, who cannot endure the smell of roses, the sight of a cat, or the like, come only from hence; that when they were but newly alive they were displeased with some such like objects, or else had a fellow feeling of their mother's resentment, who was so distasteful when she was with child. For it is certain there is an affinity between the motions of the mother and the child in her womb, so that whatsoever is displeasing to one, offends the other. And the smell of roses may have caused some great head-ache in the child, when it was in the cradle; or a cat may have frightened it, and none took notice of it, nor the child so much as remembered it; though the idea of that aversion he then had to roses, or a cat, remain imprinted in his brain to his life's end.

The 137th Article

Of the use of the five precedent passions as they relate to the body.

Now the definitions of love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness are laid down, and the corporeal motions that cause them or accompany them treated of, we have no further to do, but consider the use of them. Concerning which, it is to be observed, that according to the institution of nature they all relate to the body, and are not given to the soul, but as joined to it. So that their natural use is to incite the soul to consent and contribute to the actions, which may be useful to conserve the body, or make it in some kind more perfect. And in this sense sadness and joy are the two first that are set on work, for the soul is immediately warned of those things that are hurtful to the body by the feeling of pain,

which first of all produces the passion of sadness in her, then hatred of that which causes this pain, and in the third place the desire to be rid of it. As also, the soul is not immediately advertised of things beneficial to the body, but by some kind of tickling which exciting the passion of joy in her, breeds afterwards love of that she believes to be the cause of it, and at last desire to acquire that which may either cause this joy to continue in her, or to enjoy after it, another like it; which shows that they are all five very useful in behalf of the body. And indeed, that sadness is in some sort superior to, and more necessary than joy, and hate than love. Because it is of more moment to repel things noxious and destructive, than to acquire such as add some kind of perfection, without which it is possible to subsist.

The 138th Article

Of their faults, and the means to correct them.

But, though this use of the passions be the most natural they can have, and all irrational creatures regulate their life only by corporeal motions resembling those which in us use to follow them, and whereunto they incite our soul to consent, yet it is not always good, seeing there are many things hurtful to the body, which at first cause not any sadness, nor yet confer joy and others beneficial to it, though at first they be incommodious. And besides, they most commonly make the evils and goods they represent to us, seem much greater and weightier than they are. So that they incite us to seek after the one, and avoid the other with more vehemence and anxiety than is convenient: as we see beasts are often entrapped by baits, and to shun little evils they precipitate themselves into greater. Wherefore, we ought to make use of our experience and reason to distinguish good from evil, and know their just value, that we may not take one for the other, nor addict ourselves to anything excessively.

The 139th Article

Of the use of the same passions, as they relate to the soul; and first of love.

This were sufficient, if we had only a body, or if that were our better part. But seeing it is the least, we ought chiefly to consider the passions as they relate to the soul, in respect whereof love and hatred proceed from knowledge, and precede joy and sadness, except when these two last hold the place of knowledge whereof those are sorts; and when this knowledge is true, that is, when the things it inclines us to love, are truly good, and those it inclines us to hate are truly evil, then love is incomparably better than hatred, nor can it be too great, or fail to produce joy. I say, this love is extraordinar[ily] good; because joining true goods to us, it makes us so much the more perfect. I say also, that it cannot be too great, for what the most excessive can do, is but to join us so absolutely to those goods that we put distinction between the love we bear to that, and ourselves, which, I believe, cannot be evil. And it is necessarily followed by joy because it represents what we love, as a good belonging to us.

The 140th Article

Of hatred.

Hatred, on the contrary, cannot be so small but it hurts, and it is never without sadness. I say it cannot be too small because we are not incited by hatred to any action, but what we may be by love of the good contrary to it; at least, when this good and evil are enough understood. For I confess that the hatred of evil which is not manifested but by pain, is necessary in respect of the body. But I speak here of that which proceeds from a more clear knowledge, and I attribute it only to the soul. I say also, that it is never without sadness, because evil being but a privation, it cannot be conceived without some real subject wherein it is, and there is nothing real but has some goodness in it, so that the hatred which make us refrain from evil, does also make us refrain from the good whereunto it is annexed; and the privation of this good, being represented to our soul as a defect in her, excites sadness. For example, the hatred which makes us refrain from the evil manners of anyone, does by the same means, make us refrain from his conversation, wherein we might otherwise find some good, which we are vexed to be deprived of. And so in all other kinds of hatred some subject of sadness may be observed.

The 141st Article

Of desire, joy, and sadness.

For desire, it is evident that when it proceeds from a true knowledge, it cannot be evil, provided it be not immoderate, and that this knowledge regulate it. It is evident also, that joy cannot choose but be good, nor sadness but be evil, in respect of the soul: because in the last consist all the inconveniences that the soul receives by evil, and in the first all the enjoyment of good belonging to her. So that, if we had no bodies, I dare say, we could not give ourselves up too much to love, and joy, nor too much shun hatred, and sadness. But the corporeal motions that accompany them, may be all hurtfull to the health, when they are very violent, and on the other side useful when they are but moderate.

The 142nd Article

Of joy and love, compared with sadness and hatred.

Furthermore, since hatred and sadness ought to be rejected by the soul, even then when they proceed from a true knowledge, much more ought they to be when they come from any false opinion. But it may be doubted whether love and joy are good or no, when they likewise are ill grounded. And me thinks, if it be only considered what they are precisely in themselves, in respect of the soul, it may be said that although the joy be less solid and the love less advantageous than when they have a better foundation, they are at the worst to be preferred before sadness and hatred as ill grounded, so that in the occurrences of life,

where we cannot avoid the hazard of being deceived, we do always best to lean to those passions which tend towards good than those which have relation to evil, although it be to shun it. Nay, sometimes a false joy is better than a sadness from a true cause. But I dare not say the same of love, in relation to hatred, for when hatred is just, it removes us not from anything but the subject which contains the evil from which it is good to be separated. Whereas unjust love joins us to hurtful things, or at least to such as desire not to be so much considered by us as they are, which devours and abases us.

The 143rd Article

Of the same passions as they relate to desire.

And it must be exactly noted that what I now speak of these four passions takes place only when they are considered precisely in themselves, and incline us not to any action. For seeing they excite desire in us, by whose interposition they regulate our manners, it is certain that all those that come from a wrong cause may hurt, and on the other side, those that come of a just cause may be useful. And further, that when they are both equally ill grounded, joy is commonly more hurtful than sadness, because this, enduing a man with reserve and wariness, does in some sort incline him to prudence, whereas the other render those who give themselves up thereunto inconsiderate and rash.

The 144th Article

Of desires whose events depend only on ourselves.

But because these passions cannot sway us to any actions but by the interposition of the desire that they excite, it is desire which we ought peculiarly to regulate, and therein consists the principal part of morality. Now, as I said just now, it is always good when it follows a true knowledge so it cannot choose but be bad when it is grounded on an error. And me thinks, the most ordinary error committed in desire is when a man does not clearly enough distinguish the things which absolutely depend on ourselves, from those which do not. For concerning those which depend of us, that is of our free disposition, it is enough to know that they are good, [for us] not to desire them with too much vehemence, because it is a following of virtue to do the good things that depend of us. And it is certain, he cannot have too ardent a desire after virtue. Besides, what we thus desire cannot choose but be accomplished, since it depending only on us, we ever receive the plenary satisfaction we expect, but the usual fault herein is not that we desire too much, but too little, and the sovereign remedy against that is, as much as in us lies, to rid the spirit of all kind of desire less useful, than to strive to know clearly, and consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

The 145th Article

Of those which depend merely on causes, and what fortune.

For those things which depend not any ways of us, how good soever they be, they ought never to be desired with passion. Not only because they may not befall, and by this means afflict us so much the more, by how much more they were desired. But chiefly, because when they possess our thoughts, they divert us from bending our affection to other things, the acquisition whereof depends of ourselves. And there are two general remedies against these idle desires; the first, generosity, which I will speak of hereafter; the second is that we ought to reflect on Divine Providence, and imagine to ourselves that it is impossible that anything happen otherwise than this Providence has determined from all eternity so that there is a kind of fatality, or irresistible necessity to oppose Fortune to destroy her, as a chimera proceeding only from the error of our understandings. For we can desire nothing but what we think in some manner possible, and we cannot suppose things which depend not of us possible, seeing we think they depend not on Fortune—that is, we suppose they may happen, and the like has happened formerly. Now, this opinion is only grounded upon this, that we not understanding all the causes contributory to every effect, for when a thing which we supposed to depend on Fortune does not fall out, that shows some of the causes necessary to produce was wanting. And consequently that it was absolutely impossible and that the like did never happen, that is, where a like cause of its production was wanting. So that had we not been ignorant of that before, we should never have imagined them possible, nor consequently should ever have desired them.

The 146th Article

Of those that depend of us and others too.

This vulgar opinion then, that there is without us a Fortune which causes things to fall out, or not to fall out, according to her pleasure, must be utterly rejected. And it must be understood that all things are guided by a Divine Providence whose eternal decree is so infallible and immutable that unless those things which the same decree has pleased to let depend on our free disposition, we ought to think, for our parts, that nothing happens but what of necessity must, as if it were fatal, so that without a crime we cannot desire it may happen otherwise. But because the most part of our desires extend to two things which depend not altogether on ourselves, nor altogether elsewhere, we ought exactly to distinguish what in them depends on ourselves, that we may not let our desire ramble any farther than that. And for what is over and above, though we should esteem the success thereof absolutely fatal and immutable that our desire busy not itself thereabout, we should not omit to consider the reasons why it ought less or more to be hoped for, that they may serve to regulate our actions. For if for example, we had any business at a place whither we might go two several ways, one whereof use[d] to be much safer than the other, although the decree of Providence may be such, that if we go that way which is conceived fastest, we shall not escape robbing. And on the contrary, we might have gone the other way without any danger, yet we ought not therefore to be indifferent which we take, nor rest upon the immutable fatality of this decree. But reason wills us to choose the way which used to be safest, and our desire herein ought to be fulfilled, whatsoever evil befall us by following it. Because this evil (or mischief) having been, as to us, inevitable

we have no occasion to wish to be exempted from it but only do the best our understanding can comprehend, as, I suppose, we have done. And it is certain that when a man exercises himself so to distinguish betwixt fatality and fortune he easily habituates himself so to regulate his desires, that seeing the fulfilling of them depends only on ourselves, they may always give us an absolute satisfaction.

The 147th Article

Of the interior emotions of the soul.

I will only add here one consideration which me thinks is very useful to hinder us from receiving any discommodity by our passions. It is, that our good and will depends chiefly of interior emotions, excited in the soul only by the soul herself, wherein they differ from these passions, whichever depend of some motion of the spirits. And although these emotions of the soul be often joined to the passions resembling them, they may also be often found among other passions, and even spring from those that are contrary to them. For example, when a husband weeps for his deceased wife, whom (as oft it falls out) it would vex him to see restored to life again, it may be his heart is straightened by sadness, which the solemnity of the funeral and the absence of a person whose conversation he was used to, excite in him. And, it may be some remnants of love or pity, which present themselves to his imagination, draw true tears from his eyes. Notwithstanding that in the meantime he feels a secret joy in the most interior part of his soul, where emotion is so strong that the sadness, and tears accompanying it, cannot diminish any of its force. And when we read strange adventures in a book, or see them personated on a stage, it sometimes excites sadness in us, sometimes joy, or love, or hatred, and generally all the passions, according to the diversity of objects that offer themselves to our imagination. But withal we take a delight to feel them excited in us and this delight is an intellectual joy, which may as well spring from sadness, as all the rest of the passions.

The 148 Article

That the exercise of virtue is a sovereign remedy against the passions.

Now, forasmuch as these interior emotions do touch us nearest to the quick, and consequently have more power over us than the passions they differ from, which are met withal in them, it is certain that provided our soul have wherewithal to content her interior part, all the troubles that come from aboard, are not able to hurt her, but rather serve to augment her joy in that, seeing she cannot be injured by them, it lets her understand her own perfection. And that our soul may be thus contented, she need do nothing but exactly follow the track of virtue. For whosoever has lived so that his conscience cannot hit him in the teeth for failing to do all things which he judged to be best (which is the thing I mean here by following the track of virtue) he from thence receives a satisfaction so effectual to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the passions, shall never be strong enough to trouble the tranquility [of] his soul.

THE THIRD PART

Of particular passions.

The 149th Article

On estimation and contempt.

Now the six original passions are explained which are as the kinds (or genera) whereof all the rest are but sorts (or species). I will here succinctly observe what there is peculiar in every one of the rest, and I will keep still the same order wherein I have formally marshaled them. The two first are estimation and contempt. For, though they commonly signify only the opinions a man has, without any passion of the value of anything, yet because from these opinions do often spring passions which want peculiar names, me thinks these may be attributed to them. And estimation, as it is a passion, is an inclination of the soul to represent unto herself the value of the thing esteemed, which inclination is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, so conveyed into the brain that they there fortify the impressions belonging to that purpose. As, on the contrary, the passion of contempt is an inclination of the soul to consider the meanness or smallness of what it condemns, caused by the motion of the spirits, which fortify the idea of this smallness.

The 150th Article

That these two passions are but sorts of admiration.

So both these passions are but sorts of admiration. For when we neither admire the greatness nor smallness of an object, we make neither more nor less account of it than reason dictates to us we ought to do, so that we then esteem or condemn it without passion. And though oft-times estimation be excited in us by love, and contempt by hatred, that is not so always, and proceeds only from this: that a man is more or less inclined to consider the greatness or smallness of an object, as he has more or less affection to it.

The 151st Article

That a man may esteem, or condemn himself.

Now, these two passions may generally relate to all sorts of objects, but they are especially remarkable when we refer them to ourselves, that is, when it is our own merit that we either esteem or condemn, and the motion of the spirits which cause them is then so manifest that it even changes the countenance, gesture, gate and generally all the notions of those who conceive a better or worse opinion of themselves than ordinary.

The 152nd Article

For what cause a man may esteem himself.

And because one of the chief parts of wisdom is to know in what manner & for what cause everyone ought to esteem or condemn himself, I will here endeavour to give my opinion thereof. I observe but one thing in us which may give us just cause to esteem ourselves, to wit, the use of our free disposition and our empire over our wills. For only the actions depending on this free disposition are those for which we may justly be praised or blamed. And it makes us in some manner like unto God, by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the privileges it gives us by our unworthiness.

The 153rd Article

Wherein generosity consists.

So, I believe true generosity, which causes a man to set himself at the highest rate he justly may, consists only partly in knowing there is nothing which truly he can call his own, unless this free disposition of his wills, nor wherefore he ought to be praised or blamed, unless for using that well or ill; and partly in feeling a constant, and firm resolution in himself to use it well, that is, his will shall never be wanting to undertake and execute such things as he shall judge to be best, which is to follow virtue absolutely.

The 154th Article

That it restrains a man from condemning others.

Those who have this knowledge and resentment of themselves are easily persuaded that every other man has such of himself too, because there is nothing in it that depends of anything else. Wherefore they never condemn anybody. And though they oft-times see other men commit errors that make their weakness appear, yet they are evermore inclined to excuse than blame them, and to believe that they do it rather for want of knowledge than good will. And as they do not think themselves much inferior to those who have greater estates, honours, nor yet more wit, knowledge, beauty, or generally that surpass them in any other perfections, so they do not esteem themselves much above those whom they surpass because all these things seem very little considerable to them in comparison of their good will for which only they esteem themselves and which they suppose, is, or at least may be, in every other man.

The 155th Article

Wherein virtuous humility consists.

So the most generous use to be most humble, and virtuous humility consists only in this that the reflection we make on the infirmity of our own nature, and the faults we may have formerly committed, or those we are like[ly] to commit which are no whit less than those committed by others, is the reason why we do not prefer ourselves before anybody but

think that others, who have their free disposition as well as we, may use it as well.

The 156th Article

What the properties of generosity are and how it serves for a remedy against all unruliness of the passions.

They who thus are generous are naturally addicted to do great things, and yet to undertake nothing they are not capable of. And because they esteem nothing greater than to do good to other men, and to condemn their own interest on such an occasion, they are exquisitely courteous, affable, and officious to everyone. Withal, they are absolutely masters of their passions, especially of their desires, jealousy and envy, because there is nothing, the acquisition whereof depends not on them, whose worth they suppose can countervail a hearty desire of them, and of hatred against men, because they esteem them all; and of fear, because the confidence of their own virtue secures them; and lastly of wrath, because little valuing all things without themselves they never give their enemies so much advantage as to acknowledge that they are angry with them.

The 157th Article

Of pride.

All such as have a good conceit of themselves for anything else whatsoever, have not a real generosity but only pride, which is always very vicious, though it be so much the more as the cause for which a man esteems himself, is more unjust. And the most unjust of all, is, when he is proud for no reason, that is, though no man can see (for all this) any desert in him for which he should be prized, but only because worth is trampled on, and he imagines renown is nothing but mere usurpation, he believes that they who attribute most to themselves have most. This vice is so unreasonable and absurd that I should scarce believe there were any such men who gave themselves up thereunto, if nobody had ever been praised unjustly. But flattery is so common everywhere that there is no man so deficient, but he oft sees himself esteemed for things which merit not any praise, yea, that even deserve blame, which gives occasion to the more ignorant and stupid to fall into this sort of pride.

The 158th Article

That the effects thereof are contrary to those of generosity.

But whatsoever be the cause for which a man esteems himself, if it be ought else but the will he perceives in himself always to use well his free disposition, from whence I said generosity came, it ever produces a pride exceeding blame-worthy, and so different from this true generosity, that the effects whereof are absolutely contrary. For all other goods, as

wit, beauty, riches, honours, &c. using to be the more esteemed, for being found in fewer persons, and being for the most part of such a nature, that they cannot be communicated to many, therefore proud men endeavour to abase all other men, and being slaves to their desire, their souls are incessantly agitated with hatred, envy, jealousy, or wrath.

The 159th Article

Of dejection.

For dejection, or vicious humility it consists chiefly in this: that a man perceives himself weak, or little resolute, and, as if he had not the absolute use of his free disposition, he cannot refrain from doing things whereof he knows not whether he shall repent or no afterwards than besides; that he believes he cannot subsist of himself, nor forgo many things, whose acquisition depends from without him. So it is directly opposite to generosity, and it oft befalls that men of a mean spirit are most arrogant and proud, just as the most generous are most modest, and humble. But whereas those of a generous spirit alter not their nature by any prosperity or adversity that befalls them, those who are weak and abject are only guided by fortune and prosperity does not puff up so high, but adversity brings them down as low. Yea, it is often seen that they abase themselves shamefully to such as they expect profit or fear evil from, and at the same time lift themselves up insolently over those from whom they neither hope, nor fear anything.

The 160th Article

What the motions of the spirits in these passions is.

Moreover, it is easy to understand that pride and dejection are not only vices but passions, because their emotion is very palpable exteriorly in those who are suddenly puffed up or brought down by any new occasion. But it may be doubted whether generosity and humility, which are virtues, may also be passions, because their motions appear less, and it seems, virtue does not so much symbolize with passions, as vice does. Yet I see no reason why the same motion of the spirits which serves to fortify a thought when it has an ill ground, should not also fortify it when it has a just one. And because pride and generosity consist only in the good opinion a man has of himself, and differ only herein that the opinion in one is unjust in the other just, me thinks they may be attributed to one and the same passion, which is excited by a motion compounded of admiration, joy, and love, as well that a man bears to himself as to the thing for which he does esteem himself. As on the contrary, the motion that excites humility, whether virtuous or vicious, is composed of admiration, sadness, and self love, mixed with hatred of those defects which cause one to be condemned. And all the difference that I observe in these motions is that that of admiration has two properties. The first, that the surprise makes it strong from the very beginning. The other, that it is equal in its continuance. That is, the spirits continue moving at the same rate in the brain. Of which properties, the first is found more often in pride and dejection than in generosity or virtuous humility. And on the other side the last

is more observed in these than in the others. The reason whereof is, that vice proceeds commonly from ignorance, so that they who least understand themselves are most apt to grow more proud, or become more abject than they ought to be, because every new thing that befalls them surprises them, and causes them, that attributing it to themselves, they admire and esteem or condemn themselves, as they judge that which is befallen them advantageous to them or not. But because as soon as one thing has elated them comes another that dejects them, the motion of their passion is various. Contrarily, there is nothing in generosity, incompatible with virtuous humility, nor anything extraneous that can alter it. Wherefore the motions thereof are firm, constant, and ever like themselves. But they proceed not so much from surprise, because they who in this manner esteem themselves, do very well understand the reason why they so esteem themselves. Yet it may be said that these causes are so wonderful (to wit, the power of their free disposition, which makes them prize them themselves and the infirmities of the subject in which this power is, which makes them not to value themselves too high) that as often as they are presented new, they will cause new admiration.

The 161st Article

How generosity may be acquired.

And it is to be noted that what commonly are called virtues are habits in the soul which dispose it to certain thoughts, so that they are different from these thoughts but they may produce them, and reciprocally be produced by them. It is also to be noted, that these thoughts may be produced only by the soul, but it oft befalls that some motion of the spirits fortifies them, and then they are at the same time actions of virtue and passions of the soul. So though there be no virtue whereunto (me thinks) good birth so much contributes, as that which causes a man to esteem himself according to his just value; and it be easy to believe that all souls which God puts into our bodies are not equally noble and strong (wherefore I called this virtue generosity, according to the acceptation* of our language, rather than magnanimity, the school terms that it may be the more unknown) yet it is certain that good education much conduces to correct the defects of our birth. And that if a man busy himself frequently to consider what this free disposition is, and how great advantages accrue from a steadfast resolution to use it well, as on the other side, how vain and unprofitable all the cares that puzzle the ambitious are, a man may by exciting the passion in himself, acquire the virtue of generosity, which being as the key of all the other virtues, and a general remedy against all the irregularities of passions, me thinks this consideration ought to be very seriously noted.

* Original reads “acception”.

The 162nd Article

Of veneration.

Veneration, or respect, is an inclination of the soul not only to esteem the object it reverences, but also to submit to it with some kind of fear, to endeavour to make it become gracious to her. So that we bear only a veneration to free causes, which we conceive able to do good or evil to us, without knowing which of the two they will do. For we bear love and devotion rather than mere veneration to those from whom we only expect good, and we bear hatred to none but such as we only expect evil from. And if we conceive the cause of the good or evil not to be free, we do not submit ourselves thereunto to get the goodwill of it. So when the Pagans bore a veneration to woods, springs, mountains, they did not properly reverence these inanimate things, but the divinities which they thought presided over them. And the motion of the spirits that excite this passion is compounded of that which excites admiration and that which excites fear, whereof I will speak hereafter.

The 163rd Article

Of Disdain.

Just so, that which I call disdain is an inclination of the soul to condemn a free cause by judging that though of its own nature it be able to do either good or evil, yet it is so far beneath us that it can do us neither; and the motion of the spirits that excite it is compounded of those that excite admiration and security or boldness.

The 164th Article

Of the use of these two passions.

And it is either generosity or deification and weakness of spirit that determine the good or ill use of the two passions. For by how much a man’s soul is more noble or generous, so much the more inclination he has to give every one his own. And so [he] has not only an extraordinary humility towards God, but without reluctance bestows all the honour and respect which are due to men, to each according to the rank and authority he holds in the world, and condemns nothing but vice. On the contrary, they who are of a mean and weak spirit are apt to sin in excess, sometimes by reverencing and fearing things only worthy of contempt, sometimes by insolently disdaining such as deserve to be reverenced. And they often slip suddenly from extreme in piety to superstition, thence again from superstition to impiety, so that there is no vice nor irregularity of spirit which they are not subject to.

The 165th Article

Of hope and fear.

Hope is a disposition of the soul to persuade her that what she desires shall come to pass, which is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, to wit, by those of joy and desire mixed together. And fear is another disposition of the soul which persuades her that it

shall not come to pass. And it is to be noted that though these two passions be contrary to one another, yet a man may have them both together, to wit, when he fancies to himself several reasons whereof some make him conceive the accomplishment of his desire is easy, the other make it seem difficult.

The 166th Article

Of security and despair.

And one of these passions never accompanies desire, but it leaves room for the other. For when hope is so strong that it utterly expels fear, it alters the nature thereof and is called security. And when a man is sure that what he desires shall come to pass, though he still wishes that it would come, yet he nevertheless ceases to be agitated with the passion of desire which made him seek after the event with anxiety. In like manner when fear is so extreme that it takes away all kind of hope, it converts into despair; and this despair fancying the thing impossible, clearly extinguishes desire, which only is bent on things possible.

The 167th Article

Of jealousy.

Jealousy is a sort of fear relating to the desire a man has to keep the possession of some good; and it proceeds not so much from strength of reason, which makes him conjecture he may lose it, as the great value he sets on it, which causes him to dive into the least occasions of suspicion and take them for very considerable arguments.

The 168th Article

Wherein this passion may be laudable.

And because a man ought more carefully to keep great good than less, this passion may be just and laudable on some occasions. As for example, a captain that guards a place of great importance ought to be jealous of it, that is, mistrust all means whereby it may be taken. And an honest woman is not to be blamed for being jealous of her honour, that is, not only beware of doing ill, but also avoid even the least occasions of detraction.

The 169th Article

Wherein it is blameworthy.

But a covetous man is to be laughed at when he is jealous of his treasure, that is, when he

broods over it with his eyes, and will never be far from it, lest it should be stolen from him, for money is not worth keeping with so much care. And a man that is jealous of his wife is condemned because it is an evidence he loves her not as he should do, and has either an ill opinion of himself, or her. I say he loves her not as he should do; for if he bore a true love to her, he would never be inclined to mistrust her. But it is not her whom he properly loves, it is only the good he imagines to consist in enjoying her alone to himself. And he would not be afraid to lose this good if he did not either conceive himself unworthy of it, or his wife disloyal. Moreover, this passion relates only to suspicions and mistrusts, for he is not properly jealous, that endeavours to shun an evil, when he has just reason to fear it.

The 170th Article

Of irresolution.

Irresolution also is a sort of fear, which causing the soul to waver between several actions that she may do is the cause she cannot execute any, and thereby she has time to choose before she determines on them. Whereof, truly, some good use may be made but when it lasts longer than it ought, and it takes up that time to debate which is required to act, it is very evil. Now, I say it is a sort of fear, though it may so fall out, when a man has choice of many things whose goodness is equally apparent, that he may be at a stand and irresolute, and yet not be afraid. For this sort of irresolution comes only from the subject presented, and not from any emotion of the spirits. Wherefore it is not a passion, unless the fear of failing in his choice increase the uncertainty. But this fear is so usual, and so strong in some, that oftentimes although they have not any choice, and though they see only one thing to take or leave, yet it seizes on them and causes them unprofitably to stop there and search after others. And then it is any excess of irresolution, which proceeds from too great a desire to do well, and an imbecility in the understanding, which having no clear and distinct notions, has only a great company of confused ones. Wherefore the remedy against this excess is to accustom a man’s self to frame certain and determinate judgements concerning all things that present themselves, and conceive he does always do his duty when he does what he conceives to be best, though it may be he conceive amiss.

The 171st Article

Of courage and boldness.

Courage, when it is a passion and not a habit or natural inclination, is a certain heat or agitation which disposes the soul to addict her powerfully to the execution of the things she will do, of what nature so ever they be. And boldness is a sort of courage that disposes the soul to the execution of things most dangerous.

The 172nd Article

Of emulation.

And emulation also is a sort of it, but in another sense, for courage may be considered as a kind (or genus) that is divided into as may sorts (or species) as there are several objects, and as many more as it has causes. In the first sense boldness is a sort, in the other emulation; and this last is nothing else but a heat, which disposes the soul to undertake things that she hopes may succeed with her, because she sees them succeed with others. And so it is a sort of courage whose external cause is example. I say the external cause because it ought ever (besides that) to have an internal one which consists in this: that the body is so disposed, as desire and hope are stronger to drive abundance of blood to the heart than fear or despair to hinder it.

The 173rd Article

How boldness depends on hope.

For it is to be noted that although the object of boldness be difficulty, from whence commonly ensues fear, or even despair, so that it is in most dangerous and desperate affairs that most boldness and courage is required. Nevertheless there must be some hope, or else a man must be assured that the end he propounds to himself shall succeed to oppose himself vigorously against the difficulties he shall encounter. But this end is different from this object, for he cannot be assured and despairing of the same thing at the same time. So when the Decii flung themselves in the midst of their enemies, and ran upon a certain death, the object of their boldness was the difficulty of keeping their lives in this action, of which difficulty they utterly despaired, for they were sure to die. But their end was to animate their soldiers by their example, and make them win the victory, of which they had hope, or else their end was to get fame after their death, whereof they were assured.

The 174th Article

Of cowardice and fearfulness.

Cowardice is directly opposite to courage, and is a languishing or coldness, which hinders the soul from addicting herself to the execution of things which she would do if she were exempted from this passion. And fearfulness or affright, the contrary to boldness, is not only a coldness, but a distraction and astonishment of the soul that robs her of the power to resist evils which she thinks are near her.

The 175th Article

Of the use of cowardice.

Now, although I cannot be persuaded that nature has bestowed on man any passion that is always vicious, and has not some good and laudable use; yet I am very much puzzled to divine what these two are good for. Only, me thinks, cowardice is of some use when it causes a man to be free from pains he might be incited to take, for reasons like truths, if other more certain truths which make them be judged unprofitable, had not invited this passion in him. For besides her exemption of the soul from these pains, it is then also very useful to the body, for that retarding the motion of the spirits, it hinders the forces thereof from being dissipated. But is commonly very hurtful, because it diverts the will from profitable actions. And because it proceeds from hence, that a man has not hope, or desire enough to correct it, he need only augment these two passions in himself.

The 176th Article

Of the use of fearfulness.

As for fearfulness or affright, I see not how it can ever be laudable, or useful. Neither is it one particular passion, but only an excess of cowardice, astonishment, and fear, which is always vicious as boldness is an excel of courage, ever good, provided the end proposed be good. And because the chief cause of fearfulness is surprise, there is no better way to be rid of it than to use premeditation, and prepare oneself against all events, the fear whereof may cause them.

The 177th Article

Of remorse.

Remorse of conscience is a sort of sadness, which comes from the scruple a man has, that a thing he has done, or has not done, is not good. And it necessarily presupposes doubt. For if he had been absolutely assured that what he did had been evil, he had refrained from doing it; since the will inclines us not to any things but such as have an appearance of goodness. And if he were assured that what he has already done were evil it would breed repentance, and not only remorse. Now, the use of this passion is to make him examine whether the thing he doubts of be good or not, and to hinder him from doing it another time, if he be not assured that it is good. But because it presupposes an evil, the best way were never to be subject to feel it; and it may be prevented the same way, as a man may be exempted of irresolution.

The 178th Article

Of derision.

Derision is a sort of joy mingled with hatred which proceeds from this, that a man

perceives some little evil in a person, whereof he thinks him worthy. He hates this evil, and rejoices to see it in one that is worthy of it. And when this comes unexpectedly, the surprise of admiration causes him to break out into laughter, according to what has formerly been said of the nature of laughter. But this evil must be a small one: for if it be great, it cannot be thought that he who has it is worthy of it, unless one be of a very ill nature, or bear him a great deal of hatred.

The 179th Article

Why the most defective men are commonly the greatest deriders.

And it is seen that they who have apparent defects, for example, who are lame, one-eyed, crook-backed, or have received some affront publicly, are peculiarly inclined to derision. For desiring to see all other men as much disgraced as themselves, they rejoice at the ills that befall them and think them worthy of it.

The 180th Article

Of the use of jesting.

As for modest jesting, which wholesomely reprehends vices by making them appear ridiculous, so a man laugh not at them himself, nor show any hatred against persons, it is not a passion but a becoming quality in a man, that makes the liveliness of his disposition appear, and the tranquility of his soul, which are marks of virtue; and oft-times the nimblessness of his wit too, in that he knows how to set a handsome gloss on things he jests at.

The 181st Article

Of the use of laughter in jesting.

And it is not unhandsome to laugh at the hearing of another man’s jests: nay, perchance they may be such, that it were doltishness not to laugh at them. But when a man jests himself, it is more seemly to abstain from it, that he may not seem to be surprised by the things he speaks, nor admire the dexterity of their invention; and that causes those who hear them to be surprised so much the more.

The 182nd Article

Of envy.

That which commonly is called envy is a vice that consists in a perverseness of nature,

which causes certain men to fret at the good that they see befalls other men. But I here use this word to signify a passion which is not always vicious. Envy then, as it is a passion, is a sort of sadness mixed with hatred which comes from seeing good betide those we think unworthy of it; which cannot be thought with reason, but of the goods of fortune. For, as for those of the soul, yea and the body too, seeing a man has them by birth, it is to be sufficiently worthy of them, that he received them from God before he was capable to commit any evil.

The 183rd Article

How it may be just or unjust.

But when fortune sends goods to anyone whereof he is truly unworthy, and envy is not excited in us but because naturally, loving justice, we are vexed that it is not observed in the distribution of those goods, it is a zeal that may be excusable. Especially when the good a man envies others is of such a nature that it may turn to an evil in their hands, as if it be some command or office in the exercising whereof they may misdemean themselves. Yea, even when he desires that good for himself and cannot get it because others less worthy possess it. This makes this passion become the more violent; and yet it may be excusable, provided the hatred in it relate only to the ill distribution of the thing envied, and not to the persons that possess, or distribute it. But there are a few who are so just and generous as to bear no hatred against those that prevent them in the acquisition of a good that is not communicable to many, and that they desired it for themselves, though they who acquired it are as much or more worthy of it. And what is most usually envied is glory. For although that of others does not hinder us from aspiring thereunto, yet it makes the access to it more difficult, and enhances the price.

The 184th Article

From whence it comes that envious men have sallow complexions.

Besides, there is no vice so baneful to the felicity of man as envy. For, besides that those who are tainted with it afflict themselves, they also, to the utmost of their power trouble the delight of others. And they have commonly sallow complexions, that is, a pale mingled with yellow and black, and like blood in a bruise. Whence, envy is called in Latin “livor,” which agrees very well with what has been said here before of the motions of the blood in sadness and hatred; for this causes the yellow choler coming from the lower part of the liver, and the black coming from the spleen, to spread from the heart through the arteries into all the veins; and that causes the blood of the veins to have less heat, and flow more slowly than ordinarily, which is sufficient to make the complexion livid. But because choler, as well as yellow as black, may be also sent into the veins by many other causes, and envy may not drive enough into them to alter the colour of the complexion, unless it be exceeding[ly] great, and of long continuance it ought not to be thought that all those of this complexion are thereunto inclined.

The 185th Article

Of pity.

Pity is sort of sadness, mingled with love or goodwill towards those whom we see suffer any evil whereof we esteem them unworthy. So it is contrary to envy because of its object, and derision because it considers them in another manner.

The 186th Article

Who are most pitiful.

Those who feel themselves very weak and subject to the adversities of fortune seem to be more inclined to this passion than any else, because they fancy the evil of another as possible to befall them, and so they are moved to pity rather out of the love they bear themselves than that they bear to others.

The 187th Article

How the most generous men are sensible of this passion.

But nevertheless, they who are most generous and have the greatest spirits so that they fear not any evil to themselves, and hold themselves above the power of fortune, are not exempted from compassion when they see the infirmity of other men and hear their complaints. For it is a part of generosity to bear goodwill to every man. But the sadness of this pity is not bitter, and like that which tragic actions personated on the stage cause, is more in the exteriors and the senses, than the interiors of the soul, which in the meanwhile is satisfied to think she has done her duty, in that she has a fellow feeling with the afflicted. And there is this difference in it, that whereas the vulgar pity those who complain because they think the ills they suffer are very grievous, the principal object of great men’s pity is the weakness of those that they see complain; because they esteem not any accident that may befall to be so great an evil, as is the baseness of those who cannot suffer constantly; and though they hate the vices, yet they hate not those they see subject to them, they only pity them.

The 188th Article

Who those are that are not sensible of it.

But there are none but malignant and envious spirits who naturally hate all men, or else those who are so belluine and blinded by good fortune, or desperate through ill, that they think no further evil can befall them who are insensible of pity.

The 189th Article

Why this passion excites weeping.

Now, a man weeps easily in this passion because love, sending much blood to the heart, causes many vapours to issue through the eyes; and the coldness of sadness retarding the agitation of these vapours converts them into tears, as has been formerly said.

The 190th Article

Of satisfaction of oneself.

The satisfaction that they have, who constantly follow the paths of virtue, is a habit in their soul called tranquility or quiet of conscience. But that which a man acquires anew when he has lately done any action that he thinks good, is a passion, to wit, a sort of joy which I believe is the softest of all, because the cause thereof depends only on ourselves. Yet when this cause is not just, that is, when the actions from whence we deduct this satisfaction are no of consequence, or else are vicious, it is ridiculous and serves only to produce a pride and impertinent arrogance, which may particularly be observed in those who believing themselves to be devout are only hypocritical and superstitious, that is, who under pretence of frequenting the church, saying many prayers, wearing short hair, fasting, giving alms, suppose they are exquisitely perfect, and imagine they are God’s so intimate friends that they can do nothing that can displease him; and whatsoever their passions dictate to them is a good zeal: although it sometime dictate to them the greatest crimes that can be committed by men, as betraying of cities murdering of princes, exterminating whole nations merely for this, that they are not of their opinion.

The 191st Article

Of repentance.

Repentance is directly contrary to satisfaction of oneself. And it is a sort of sadness proceeding from a belief that a man has done some evil action, and it is very bitter because the cause comes only from ourselves. Yet nevertheless, this hinders it not from being very useful, when it is true, that the action we repent of is evil, and that we have a certain knowledge thereof, because it incites us to do better another time. But it oft-times comes to pass that weak spirits repent the things they have done, not knowing certainly that they are evil. They persuade themselves so, only because they fear it is so, and had they done the contrary, they had repented too—which is an imperfection in them to be pitied. And the remedies against this defect are the same that serve to take away irresolution.

The 192nd Article

Of goodwill.

Goodwill is properly a desire to see good befall anyone has a goodwill to: but I use this word here to signify this will as it is excited in us by some good action of him to whom we bear it. For we are naturally addicted to love those who do things which we esteem good, although no good come to us by them. Goodwill in this sense is a sort of love, not desire, though the desire of seeing good befall him whom we wish well to always accompanies it. And it is ordinarily joined with pity because the disgraces that we see betide the unfortunate cause us to reflect the more upon their deserts.

The 193rd Article

Of gratitude.

Gratitude is also a sort of love, excited in us by some action of him to whom we offer it, and whereby we believe he has done us some good, or at least had an intention to do us some. So it includes all that goodwill does, and this besides, that it is grounded on an action we are very sensible of, and whereof we have a desire to make a requital. Wherefore it is far more strong, especially in souls never so little noble and generous.

The 194th Article

Of ingratitude.

For ingratitude, it is not a passion, for nature never put any motion of the spirits in us to excite it. But it is only a vice directly opposite to gratitude, seeing this is ever virtuous, and one of the principal bonds of human society. Wherefore this vice appertains to none but belluine men, and the foolishly arrogant, who think all things their due; or the sottish who reflect not on the good deeds they receive; or else the weak, and abject, who feeling their own infirmity and necessity, basely seek assistance from others, and after they have received it hate them because having no will to return the like, or despairing ever to do it, and imagining the whole world as mercenary as themselves, and that none do good but with hope of being rewarded for it, they think they have desired it.

The 195th Article

Of indignation.

Indignation is a sort of hatred or aversion that a man naturally bears to those who do some evil, of what nature so ever it be. And it is often mixed with envy or pity, but yet the object thereof is altogether different from them. For he carries an indignation only against those

who do good or evil to persons unworthy of it. But he envies those who receive this good, and pities those who receive this evil. It is true, in some respects it is evil to possess a good whereof a man is not worthy. Which may be the reason wherefore Aristotle and his followers supposing that envy is always a vice, have called that indignation which is not vicious.

The 196th Article

Why it is sometimes joined with pity and sometimes with derision.

To do an evil is also in some respects to receive one, from whence it comes that some with their indignation join pity and others derision, according as they bear a good or ill will towards those whom they see commit faults. Thus the laughter of Democritus, and the weeping of Heraclitus, might proceed from the same cause.

The 197th Article

That it is often accompanied with admiration, and is not incompatible with joy.

Indignation is also oft-times accompanied with admiration. For we use to think that all things shall be done in the same manner we conceive they ought to be done, that is, after that manner which we esteem good. Wherefore when it falls out otherwise it surprises us, and we admire it. Nor is it incompatible with joy, although it most commonly be joined with sadness. For when the evil we bear an indignation against cannot hurt us, and we consider that we would not do the like, it gives us some delight. And this may be one of the causes of laughter, which sometimes accompanies this passion.

The 198th Article

Of the use of it.

Furthermore, indignation is observed to be more in those who would seem virtuous than those who really are. For although they who love virtue cannot without some aversion look upon the vices of others, they are passionate only against the great and extraordinary ones. For it is to be nice, and squamish[?], to have much indignation for things of little concernment; it is to be unjust to have any for those which are not blameworthy; and it is to be impertinent and absurd not to confine this passion to the actions of men, but extend them to the works of God or nature—as they do who being never contented with their condition or fortune dare control the government of the world, and the secrets of Providence.

The 199th Article

Of wrath.

Wrath is also a sort of hatred or aversion against those that have done any evil, or endeavoured to hurt, not indifferently anything whatsoever, but particularly ourselves. So it contains all indignation does, and this besides, that it is grounded upon an action that we are sensible of, and whereof we have a desire to be revenged. For this desire almost ever accompanies it, and is directly opposite to gratitude as indignation is to goodwill. But it is, without compare, more violent than these other three passions because the desire to repel things hurtful, and be revenged, is most vehement of all. It is this desire joined to self-love that furnishes wrath with all the agitation of blood that courage and boldness can cause. And hatred especially cases the choleric blood that comes from the spleen, and the little veins of the liver, which receives this agitation, and gets into the heart: or because of its abundance, and the nature of the choler wherewith it is mingled, it excites a sharper and more ardent heat than can be excited therein either by love or joy.

The 200th Article

Wherefore those whom it causes to blush are less to be feared than they whom it causes to wax pale.

And the exterior signs of this passion are different, according to the several tempers of men, and the variety of other passions that make it up or join with it. So some are seen to wax pale, or tremble, when they are in wrath; others blush or weep. And it is usually thought that the wrath of those who wax pale is more to be feared than of those who blush. The reason whereof is that when a man will not, or cannot revenge himself with ought but looks or words, he sets all his heat and strength on work at the very first, when he is moved, besides that sometimes sorrow and self-pity that he cannot revenge himself any other way, occasions weeping. And on the contrary, they who reserve themselves and determine on a greater revenge become sad in regard they think they ought to be so for the action that incenses them. And they sometimes also fear the evils that ensue the resolution they have taken; which makes them instantly become pale, cold, and trembling. But afterwards when they come to execute their revenge, they are so much the more heated, as they were at first cooled, as we see agues that begin with cold fits are usually the violentest.

The 201st Article

That of these two sorts of wrath, they who have most goodness are most subject to the first.

This informs us that two sorts of wrath may be distinguished; one sudden and exteriorly manifest, but yet of small efficacy, and easily appeased; the other not so apparent at first,

but that gnaws more on the heart, and has more dangerous effects. Those who have much goodness and love are the most subject to the first; for it proceeds not from any deep hatred, but from a sudden aversion that surprises them because being addicted to imagine that all things ought to be carried the way they conceive to be best, as soon as anything falls out otherwise they admire it and are angry at it, oftentimes too, when the thing concerns not them in particular, because being full of affection, they interest themselves in the behalf of those they love, as if it were for themselves; so what would only be an occasion of indignation to another is to them of wrath; and because their inclination to love makes them always have a great deal of heat and blood in the heart, the aversion that surprises them that drives never so little choler thither, causes immediately a great emotion in this blood. But this emotion is not lasting because the strength of the surprise continues not and as soon as they perceive that the occasion that incenses them ought not to have moved them so, they repent thereof.

The 202nd Article

That weak and mean souls suffer themselves most to be swayed with the other.

The other sort of wrath, wherein hatred and sadness predominates, is not at first so apparent, unless that it may be it make the face look pale. But the strength thereof is increased by little and little by the agitation which an ardent desire of revenge excites in the blood, which being mixed with choler driven to the heart from the lower part of the liver, and the spleen, excites therein a very sharp and pricking heat. And as the most generous souls are fullest of gratitude, so they who are proudest, meanest, and lowest give themselves up most to this sort of wrath. For injuries appear so much the greater as pride makes a man esteem himself higher; and also seeing how much more a man esteems the goods they dispose him of, which he values the more, the lower and meaner that his soul is because they are extraneous.

The 203rd Article

That generosity is a remedy against the excesses thereof.

Besides, although this passion be useful to confer vigour on us to repel injuries, nevertheless, there is not anyone, whose excesses ought to be avoided with more care. Because by disturbing the judgement, they oft-times cause a man to commit faults, whereof he afterwards repents. Yes, and sometimes hinder him from repelling injuries so well as he might have done, had he had less emotion. But as nothing makes it more excessive than pride, so I believe, generosity is the best remedy against the excesses of it. Because making a man esteem but very little all such goods as may be taken away, and on the other side highly value the liberty and absolute empire over himself, which he ceases to have when anything can offend him, it makes him only bestow contempt, or at the most indignation on the injuries others use to be offended at.

The 204th Article

Of glory.

What I here call glory is a sort of joy, grounded on self-love, and comes from an opinion or hope a man has to be praised by some others. So it differs from inward satisfaction, which proceeds from an opinion of having done a good action. For a man is often applauded for things that are not believed to be good, and blamed for those that are believed to be better. But both of them are sorts of self-estimations, as well as sorts of joy, for it is an occasion for a man to esteem himself to see that he is esteemed by others.

The 205th Article

Of shame.

On the contrary, shame is a sort of sadness grounded also on self-love, and proceeds from an opinion, or a fear a man has to be blamed. It is besides, a sort of modesty, or humility and mistrust of oneself. For when a man esteems himself so highly that he cannot imagine anyone can condemn him, he cannot easily be ashamed.

The 206th Article

Of the use of these two passions.

Now, there is the same use of glory and shame, in that they incite us to virtue, one by hope, the other by fear. It is only needful to instruct the judgement, concerning what is truly blameworthy or laudable, not to be ashamed of well-doing and not to boast of vices as many do, but it is not good absolutely to divest ourselves of these passions, as the Cynics did heretofore. For although the people judge very waywardly, yet since we cannot live without them, and that it behoves us to be esteemed by them, we ought oftentimes to follow their opinions rather than our own, concerning the exterior part of our actions.

The 207th Article

Of impudence.

Impudence which is a contempt of shame, and oft of glory, is not a passion because there is not any peculiar motion in us that excites it. But it is a vice opposite to shame, and also to glory, while either of them are good, as ingratitude is opposite to gratitude, and cruelty to pity. And the chief cause of impudence comes from often receiving great affronts; for there is none when he is young but imagines that praise is a good, and infamy an evil, much more important to life than experience finds they are. When having received some eminent affronts, a man sees himself utterly degraded of honour, and condemned by

everyone; wherefore they become impudent, and measuring good and evil only by the conveniences of the body, they see that they enjoy them afterwards as well, yea, and sometimes better, because they are eased of many hardships, whereunto honour obliged them. And if the loss of their estate be joined to their disgrace, yet there are charitable people who will give them some.

The 208th Article

Of distaste.

Distaste is a sort of sadness, proceeding from the same cause whereof joy came before. For we are so made up that the most part of the things we enjoy are only good to us for a season, and afterwards become incommodious. Which especially appears in drinking and eating, which are only useful while a man has a stomach, and troublesome when he has no more; and because they then leave to be pleasant to the taste, this passion is called distaste.

The 209th Article

Of sorrow.

Sorrow is also a sort of sadness, which has a peculiar bitterness in that it is ever joined to some despair and remembrance of the delight we took in enjoying it. For we are never sorry for any goods but those we have enjoyed and which are so lost that we have no hope to recover them at that time, and in that manner as we sorrow for them.

The 210th Article

Of lightheartedness.

Lastly, that which I call lightheartedness is a sort of joy, which has this thing peculiar to itself, that the sweetness of it is augmented by the remembrance of misfortunes suffered, whereof a man feels himself eased as if he felt himself discharged of a heavy burden he had long born on his shoulders. And I see nothing very remarkable in these three passions; nor have I placed them here, but to follow the method of my former enumeration. But, me thinks, this enumeration was useful to show that we have not omitted any, which was worthy of peculiar consideration.

The 211th Article

A general remedy against the passions.

And now we know them all, we have less reason to fear them than we had before. For we

see that naturally they are all good, and that we ought to avoid only the ill use of them, or their excesses, for which the remedies I have laid down may suffice, if every man were careful enough to practise them. But because I have put premeditation and industry among these remedies, whereby the defects of nature may be corrected by using to separate the motions of the blood & spirits in oneself from the thoughts wherewith they [are] use[d] to be[ing] joined. I confess, few men are thus prepared against all encounters, and that these motions excited in the blood by the objects of passions do so immediately follow the mere impressions in the brain and the disposition of the organs. Although the soul be no way contributory that no human wisdom is able to resist them when one is not enough prepared so, many cannot refrain from laughing when they are tickled, though they take no delight in it. For the impression and surprise of joy that has made them laugh formerly on the same occasion, being awakened in their fancy, makes their lungs be blown up on a sudden whether they will or no by the blood that the heart sends thither. So they who are much addicted by nature to the emotions of joy, or pity, or cheerfulness, or wrath, cannot refrain from swooning, weeping, trembling, or having the blood stirred as if they had a fever, when their fancy is thoroughly sensible by an object of any of these passions. But what may be done on such an occasion, and what I think to lay down here as the most general remedy, and the easiest to be practised, against all exorbitances of the passions, is that when a man perceives his blood thus moved, he ought to be wary and remember that whatsoever is presented to our imagination tends to the delusion of the soul, and makes reasons that serve to persuade the object of passions appear far stronger than they are, and those which serve to dissuade, far weaker. And when passion persuades things, the execution whereof admits of some delay, he must abstain from giving his judgement thereon immediately, and divert himself from it to other thoughts, until time, and rest, have wholly allayed the emotion in the blood. And lastly, when it incites to actions, concerning which resolutions are instantly to be taken, the will must peculiarly dedicate itself to consider and follow the reasons repugnant to those which the passion represents, although they appear less weighty. As when a man is suddenly assaulted by an enemy, occasion does not give him leave to waste any time in debate. But what it seems, those who are accustomed to make a reflection on their own actions may do, that is, when they feel themselves struck with an affright they will endeavour to divert their thoughts from the consideration of the danger, by representing to themselves the reasons wherefore there is more safety and honour in resistance than flight. And on the contrary, when they feel the desire of revenge and wrath incite them to rush inconsiderately on those who beset them, they should call to mind that is indiscretion to destroy themselves when they may be saved without dishonour. And if there be too much odds, it is better to make a handsome retreat, or take quarter, than savagely to expose themselves to a certain death.

The 212th Article

That from them alone all the good and evil of this life depends.

Now the soul may have her delights distinctly by herself, but for those which are common to her with the body, they absolutely depend on the passions, so that those men whom they move most may be apt to taste most sweetness in this life. It is true, they may also find the

most bitterness, when they do not understand how to employ them well, and fortune is adverse to them. But wisdom is herein especially requisite, that it teach us so to make ourselves masters of them, and manage them with so much dexterity, that the evils they cause may be easily endured, and we may even extract joy from them all.